Article: The Nature of the Interest of an Object of Trust or Power

Lusina Ho (University of Hong Kong, Faculty of Law) recently published The Nature of the Interest of an Object of Trust or Power, 2026. Provided below is the Abstract:

This chapter contends that it is overly reductive to characterize the interests of beneficiaries of trusts and objects of powers using singular labels like in rem rights, in personam rights, and ‘rights against rights’. Instead, these parties hold a bespoke bundle of in personam rights and powers, binding trustees and any third parties whose conscience is affected. This bundle comprises tailored rights regarding the distribution of trust benefits, rights that relate not to the trustees’ rights over the trust property but to their personal fiduciary obligations towards the beneficiaries, and identical but separate powers to enforce the due administration of the trust against trustees and third parties. Crucially, the right to benefit from the trust property is distinct from the power to enforce due administration, and standing in trusts is not limited to the former. Further, the power of enforcement remains in personam even though it binds third parties; unlike in rem rights, which imposes the same liability against the world, rights under a trust generate liabilities on third parties that are distinct from those of the original trustee.