It is well established that a criminal defendant has a Constitutional right to testify at trial that cannot be overriden by defense counsel. For example, at Darla’s murder trial, defense counsel could not force Darla to remain off the witness stand. Instead, Darla would be allowed to testify at trial, even over her attorney’s objection.
But what would happen if there were a competence hearing to determine whether Darla was competent to stand trial? If Darla wanted to testify at trial while her attorney wanted her to stay silent, who should win out? That was the question of first impression addressed by a California appellate court in People v. Garcia, 2026 WL 3119294 (2026).
In Garcia, Martin Lackey-Garcia was charged with murder and attempted murder after stabbing multiple people at a mental health facility. Thereafter, before trial, Lackey-Garcia’s competence to stand trial was called into doubt, and psychologists were appointed to evaluate him. Subsequently, “[d]uring the competency hearing, Lackey-Garcia asked to testify on his own behalf, but the trial court deferred to defense counsel’s decision that Lackey-Garcia should not testify.” Lackey-Garcia was deemed competent to stand trial, decided to represent himself, was convicted of all counts, and was given a life sentence.
On appeal, Lackey-Garcia claimed that he was deprived of his right to testify at his competency hearing. In denying this appeal, the court cited to People v. Bell, 181 Cal.App.4th 1071, 105 Cal.Rptr.3d 259 (2010), noting that
In that case, the trial court permitted the defendant to testify at a competency hearing, over his counsel’s objection, and the jury found the defendant competent to stand trial….On appeal following his conviction, the defendant argued that the trial court had erred in allowing him to testify….The court of appeal agreed, reasoning that a defendant “has a due process right not to be tried while he [or she] is incompetent,” and as in Masterson, “counsel is in the best position to determine” whether a defendant whose competence has been called into question “should testify in order to protect this right.”
The court then concluded that
Although Bell involved a different factual scenario—unlike here, defendant Bell was permitted to testify over the objection of his lawyer—we find its analysis applicable to the question before us. As explained above, our state high court has consistently distinguished competency proceedings from criminal trials, emphasizing that, when a doubt about a defendant’s competence has been declared, as here, it is unclear whether a defendant is able to make knowing and voluntary decisions to protect his or her rights. Given that circumstance, the court has permitted counsel to make decisions essential to the conduct of the proceedings—including whether to even have an adversarial hearing or to put on any oral testimony at all. Lackey-Garcia provides no persuasive reason why counsel with authority to waive altogether an adversarial hearing may not also make the determination whether a defendant, whose competency is in doubt, will testify. We thus agree with Bell that counsel retains the authority to override a defendant’s expressed desire to testify at a competency proceeding.
I’m not sure I agree. As the court notes, at a competency hearing, “it is unclear whether a defendant is able to make knowing and voluntary decisions to protect his or her rights.” This would be a reason to initially keep the defendant off the stand. But if, as in Garcia, defense counsel decides to keep their client from testifying, wouldn’t it make sense for the judge to make a preliminary ruling and then reconsider defense counsel’s decision?
For example, in Garcia, without the defendant testifying, the judge deemed him competent to stand trial. Before finalizing that decision, wouldn’t it make sense to allow the defendant to exercise his right to testify? At that point, the worst thing that could happen would be that the judge sticks with her preliminary ruling. Or, when the judge sees the defendant on the stand, she could see that he is in fact not competent to stand trial.
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