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We had already written all we thought we had to say about the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Berk v. Choy, 607 U.S. 187 (2026).  But one of Reed Smith’s crack paralegals recently spotted and circulated a copy of a brief that the plaintiffs in the Camp LeJeune Water MDL filed in late October claiming that – somehow – Berk precluded the MDL judge from entering a case vetting (a/k/a “Lone Pine”) order as a case management tool.  In writing our previous post on Berk, the possibility of such a result never crossed our minds, and as all our readers know, we are big proponents of Lone Pine orders, so much so that we maintain a “Lone Pine Cheat Sheet” that currently collects 77 favorable decisions.

Our Lone Pine-attuned eyes were surprised to see that argument.  Since it has appeared once, in an MDL setting, there is a significant likelihood that other defendants in other litigation will be faced with similar arguments.  So we thought we’d analyze/rebut it.  Here’s the argument, in full – it’s not all that long:

BERK ENDED FEDERAL MERITS-BASED LONE PINE ORDERS.

The Supreme Court of the United States recently rejected a procedure analogous to Defendant’s proposal here.  In a near-unanimous decision, the Supreme Court explained that the Federal Rules prescribe a single mechanism for “putting a plaintiff to his proof” before trial:  a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56.  Berk, 607 U.S. at 197.  That procedural mechanism carries protections a docket-control order can neither replicate nor remove. . . .   

In Berk, the defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff’s medical malpractice complaint filed in federal court because it was not accompanied by the affidavit of merit that Delaware law required.  607 U.S. at 192-93. The Court held that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 answered the same question the Delaware requirement addressed and therefore displaced it.  Id. at 193-94.  In response to the defendants’ proposal that the district court instead require the equivalent of a certificate of merit after the pleadings (but presumably before discovery) and enforceable by dismissal, the Court explained that such a requirement was “no longer a pleading requirement that serves a gatekeeping function; it is a free-floating evidentiary requirement that can serve as the basis for an early dismissal.”  Id. at 197.  The Court rejected that device for a reason dispositive here: “the Federal Rules already prescribe a mechanism for putting a plaintiff to his proof: a motion for summary judgment.”  Id.  “That defendants cannot fit the affidavit requirement into the Federal Rules,” the Supreme Court concluded, “illustrates that it has no place there.”  Id.  A district court’s case-management authority “cannot be contrary to any express grant of or limitation on the district court’s power contained in a rule or statute,” and “must be exercised with restraint.” Dietz v. Bouldin, 579 U.S. 40, 45, 47 (2016).

Berk thus establishes a structural rule of decision:  a court may not compel a plaintiff to come forward with evidence proving the merits of his claim as a precondition to continued litigation and on pain of dismissal through any device other than Rule 56.

Brief at 8-9 (emphasis added).

We start our critique with the first line of the argument – “analogous.”  That’s an admission that Berk is not directly on point, and thus should not be construed to have worked the dramatic change in the law that plaintiffs advocate.  As we discussed in our prior Berk post, that decision solely involves state-law issues, specifically whether a state mandated procedure not found in the federal rules can apply in federal court. 

The Court’s analysis in Berk has three elements:  First, the “Rules of Decision Act [28 U.S.C. §1652] dictates that state substantive law must yield if . . . a [federal] statute “otherwise require[s] or provide[s].”  Berk, 607 U.S. at 192 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added) .  Second, the Rules Enabling Act is such a statute, since it “authorizes“ the Supreme Court to “prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and rules of evidence,”  Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. §2072(a), “for district courts, [and] provides for the application of federal law.”  Id. (citations omitted).  Thus, “a valid Rule of Civil Procedure displaces contrary state law even if the state law would qualify as substantive under Erie’s test.”  Id.  Thus, Berk was a “straightforward” application of when “a Federal Rule displaces state law.”  Id.

Berk thus has nothing to do with the authority of federal courts to enter Lone Pine orders under the federal rules.  And that is precisely what Lone Pine orders of the sort at issue in the Camp LeJeune – or any other − MDL involve.  Plaintiffs improperly seek to conflate pleading standards with case management.

The authority of federal courts to impose Lone Pine orders has universally been found in Fed. R. Civ. P. 16. 

District courts have broad discretion in deciding how best to manage the cases before them, and Rule 16(c)(2)(L) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows district courts to “adopt[ ] special procedures for managing potentially difficult or protracted actions that may involve complex issues, multiple parties, difficult legal questions, or unusual proof problems.”

Adinolfe v. United Technologies Corp., 768 F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2014) (citations and quotation marks omitted).

We agree . . . that district judges have broad discretion to manage discovery and to control the course of litigation under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16. . . .  No basis appears for us to cordon off one type of order − a prima facie order on exposure and causation in toxic tort litigation − from the universe of case management orders that a district court has discretion to impose. . . .  Neither does the prima facie process skirt accepted procedure.

Avila v. Willits Environmental Remediation Trust, 633 F.3d 828, 833-34 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted) (following Acuna).

The pre-discovery orders in issue are of a type known as Lone Pine orders. . . .  Lone Pine orders are designed to handle the complex issues and potential burdens on defendants and the court in mass tort litigation.  In the federal courts, such orders are issued under the wide discretion afforded district judges over the management of discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.

Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 340 (5th Cir. 2000) (citation omitted).  Accord Conklin v. Corteva, Inc., 782 F. Supp.3d 268, 274 (E.D.N.C. 2025) (“Courts in mass torts cases ‘routinely’ issue Lone Pine orders, often under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(3) and 16(c)(2)(L)”) (numerous citations omitted); Andres v. Town of Wheatfield, 621 F. Supp.3d 395, 399 (W.D.N.Y. 2022) (“Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(c)(2)(L) permits” Lone Pine orders”; “The basic purpose of a Lone Pine order is to identify and cull potentially meritless claims and streamline litigation in complex cases.”) (citation and quotation marks omitted); Russell v. Chesapeake Appalachia, L.L.C., 305 F.R.D. 78, 83 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (concerning “Lone Pine orders, federal courts have interpreted the broad case management powers Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16 bestows on them”); McMunn v. Babcock & Wilcox Power Generation Group, Inc., 896 F. Supp.2d 347, 351 (W.D. Pa. 2012) (“Defendants’ [Lone Pine] motions are neither motions for summary judgment under Rule 56 nor motions in limine, but rather the appropriate mechanism to probe whether Plaintiffs have complied with the CMO.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(c)(2)(A).”); In re Digitek Products Liability Litigation, 264 F.R.D. 249, 256 (S.D.W. Va. 2010) (“Lone Pine orders have proven useful at times in complex litigation, and the courts citing authority for this type of extraordinary procedure typically rely upon the broad permission bestowed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16.”); McManaway v. KBR, Inc., 265 F.R.D. 384, 385 (S.D. Ind. 2009) (“Lone Pine orders are permitted by Rule 16(c)(2)(L) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).

Unpublished decisions likewise recognizing Rule 16’s applicability to Lone Pine orders abound.  See In re Johnson & Johnson Talcum Powder Products Marketing, Sales Practices, & Products Liability Litigation, 2026 WL 2111340, at *4 (D.N.J. July 22, 2026); Barnes v. Dresser LLC, 2025 WL 3679762, at *3 (W.D. La. Dec. 18, 2025); In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Products Liability Litigation, 2024 WL 4362982, at *3 (E.D. La. Oct. 1, 2024); In re Taxotere (Docetaxel) Products Liability Litigation, 2024 WL 718698, at *2 (E.D. La. Feb. 21, 2024); D&J Investments, LLC v. Dresser, LLC, 2024 WL 290186, at *2 (W.D. La. Jan. 25, 2024); Barrett v. Dresser, LLC, 2023 WL 6613163, at *2 (W.D. La. Oct. 10, 2023); Alvey v. General Electric Co., 2021 WL 2012940, at *2 (S.D. Ind. March 29, 2021); Matter of AET, Inc., 2018 WL 4203351, at *2-3 (E.D. Tex. Feb. 13, 2018); Armendariz v. Santa Fe County Board of Commissioners, 2018 WL 377199, at *2 (D.N.M. Jan. 11, 2018); Marquez v. BNSF Railway, 2017 WL 3390577, at *1 (D. Colo. Aug. 8, 2017); Adkisson v. Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc., 2016 WL 4079531, at *3 (Mag. E.D. Tenn. July 29, 2016); Trujillo Ametek, Inc., 2016 WL 3552029, at *2 (S.D. Cal. June 28, 2016); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2016 WL 614690, at *7 (E.D. La. Feb. 16, 2016); Modern Holdings, LLC v. Corning Inc., 2015 WL 6482374, at *3 (E.D. Ky. Oct. 27, 2015); Ashford v. Hercules, Inc., 2015 WL 6118387, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Oct. 16, 2015); Abner v. Hercules, Inc., 2014 WL 5817542, at *2-6 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 10, 2014), amended on other grounds, 2015 WL 13821942 (S.D. Miss. Feb. 5, 2015); Baker v. Anschutz Exploration Corp., 2013 WL 3282880, at *2 (W.D.N.Y. June 27, 2013); Hagy v. Equitable Production Co., 2012 WL 713778, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. March 5, 2012); In re Fosamax Products Liability Litigation, 2012 WL 5877418, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 20, 2012); Ramos v. Playtex Products, Inc., 2008 WL 4066250, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2008).  See 6A C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure §1525 & n.30 (3d ed. 2016) (discussing Lone Pine orders under Rule 16).

Nor does Berk in any way suggest that summary judgment is the only basis for a “merits” dismissal under the federal rules.  It simply discusses Rule 56 as something that that is not analogous to the state pleading requirement before the Court.  Summary judgment was only referenced in Berk to reject the defendant’s attempt to shoehorn the state-law pleading-related medical malpractice affidavit requirement into a federal court’s “inherent authority.”  Summary judgment was not analogous, because comparatively it gave the defendant too little protection:

Defendants’ first choice is the course the District Court took here:  dismissal based on the court’s inherent authority.  The problem, however, is that the Federal Rules already prescribe a mechanism for putting a plaintiff to his proof: a motion for summary judgment.  See Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56.  And that does not offer defendants the protection they want, because before ruling on the motion, the court must allow the nonmovant adequate time for discovery.  That defendants cannot fit the affidavit requirement into the Federal Rules illustrates that it has no place there.

907 U.S. at 197 (citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis added).

“Putting a plaintiff to his proof” has nothing to do with a trial court’s ability to manage discovery under Rule 16 or an MDL judge’s additional ability to decide “how and when the parties will exchange information about the factual bases for their claims and defenses” as provided by Fed. R. Civ. P. 16.1(b)(3)(E).  While the state-law affidavit requirement at the pleading stage had no analogy in the federal rules in Berk, wholly federal requirements concerning management of discovery in Rules 16 and 16.1 fully incorporate federal judicial power to issue and enforce Lone Pine orders.  Essentially, by seizing on the Berk Court’s passing reference to summary judgment in a preemption case having nothing to do with federal case management, plaintiffs’ latest argument is simply an attempt to resurrect, in new garb, the oft-rejected plaintiff argument that summary judgment and Lone Pine orders are somehow incompatible.

As we’ve already discussed, the Third Circuit was the most recent court to hold that nothing in the federal rules precludes Lone Pine orders or mandates sole use of summary judgment in mass tort litigation.  In determining that the MDL court “was not required to resolve the 1,189 Group A cases through summary judgment,” the Third Circuit decided:

We have recognized that an MDL court must be given wide latitude with regard to case management. This wide latitude applies not only to issuing case management orders but also to dismissing cases for non-compliance with such orders . . . under especially where plaintiffs are put on notice by a motion that dismissal was being sought, and given the opportunity to oppose that motion. . . .  This is particularly true when an MDL court tasked with overseeing thousands of cases has already elucidated its interpretation of a case management order and has warned the parties that failure to comply with the order could result in dismissal. . . .  

It would have been pointless to allow the Group A cases to proceed to summary judgment because plaintiffs had failed to explain how they could prove specific causation without [the required evidence]. . . .  To put it bluntly, if Plaintiffs had a way to prove specific causation, common sense dictates that it would have surfaced by now.”  We therefore conclude the District Court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the 1,189 Group A cases under Rule 41(b) instead of allowing them to proceed to summary judgment.

In re Zostavax (Zoster Vaccine Live) Products Liability Litigation, 2024 WL 3423709, at *3-4 (3d Cir. July 16, 2024) (footnotes omitted).  Accord Avila, 633 F.3d at 833 (rejecting claim that Lone Pine orders “bypass” summary judgment procedures); Trujillo, 2017 WL 3026107, at *5 (“the purpose of a Lone Pine order is to cull potentially meritless claims, not to replace a motion for summary judgment”); In re Oil Spill by the Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon” in the Gulf of Mexico, on April 20, 2010, 2014 WL 12692765, at *3 (E.D. La. July 17, 2014) (“The Lone Pine-type protocol articulated below will assist the Court to streamline the remaining . . . claims, [and] rule on [certain] Defendants’ pending summary judgment motions”); Abner, 2014 WL 5817542, at *4 (“Multiple courts have found that Lone Pine orders are appropriate only where other available procedural devices such as summary judgment, motions to dismiss, motions for sanctions and other similar rules are insufficient to address the issues at hand”); In re Vioxx Products Liability Litigation, 2012 WL 1398622 at *4 (E.D. La. April 23, 2012):

The purpose of these Lone Pine orders was to screen viable claims from nonviable claims, and thus it will be appropriate in some instances to grant summary judgment where the case-specific expert report does not suggest an injury causally linked to [the product].  Otherwise, a Lone Pine order has no teeth.  Thus, summary judgment based on the insufficiency of [Lone Pine response] is not categorically forbidden.

AET, 2011 WL 13301617, at *7 (“characterization of the Lone Pine Order as an improper vehicle for summary judgment is unfounded”; “Lone Pine orders . . . are pre-discovery, case management tools used to ascertain the existence of a prima facie basis for the claims asserted”; “the Court does not assess whether Plaintiffs’ affidavits are sufficient under a summary judgment standard; it considers merely whether each affidavit would support filing of a lawsuit under a Rule 11 standard.”); In re 2000 ExxonMobil Release Litigation, 2003 WL 27428596, at *2 (M.D. La. Feb. 13, 2003) “Whether a summary judgment for the defendant is appropriate in a particular case is a question separate and distinct from whether the plaintiff’s claims should be dismissed as a discovery sanction.”) (footnote omitted).  Ultimately, nothing has changed since one of the original mass torts that introduced Lone Pine orders into federal jurisprudence – such orders are preliminary, and in no way governed by summary judgment standards:

In Pretrial Order 1172, the court explained that the causation reports were meant to serve as a Rule 11 safeguard. . . .  These reports were not intended be used as subjects for motions that are tantamount to summary judgment. . . .  The causation report is simply a procedural requirement that each plaintiff must fulfill to satisfy the court that the attorneys had a reasonable basis to pursue the claims asserted in the complaints filed on their client’s behalf. Under this rationale, the minimum standard that each causation report must meet is whether the court would consider an attorney bringing a claim against a defendant in this litigation based on the causation report to be in violation of Rule 11.

In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 1998 WL 411370, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 13, 1998).  Accord Acuna v. Brown & Root, Inc., 1998 WL 35283824, at *5 (W.D. Tex. Sept. 30, 1998) (“address[ing] Plaintiffs’ persistent mischaracterization of the Lone Pine provision as tantamount to a requirement that they defeat a motion for summary judgment as to causation at this early stage of the litigation”) (following Orthopedic Bone Screw), aff’d, 200 F.3d 335 (5th Cir. 2000).

Thus, the Camp LeJeune claim that Berk v. Choy somehow impliedly abolished Lone Pine orders throughout the federal court system is complete hooey.  Berk involved preemption of state procedural law by the Federal Rules.  It did not construe the scope of any federal rule.  Berk did not involve Lone Pine orders in any way.  Nor is there any inherent incompatibility between Lone Pine orders and Rule 56, since Lone Pine orders are a form of discovery order, often imbued with Rule 11 overtones – not anything involving the existence of genuine orders of material fact.