In a classic Seinfeld episode, George Costanza once built a bed under his desk at Yankee Stadium so he could nap during the workday.
But note to future employees: Sleeping on the job can (and probably will) get you fired on the job and the courts can (and likely will) dismiss a lawsuit against the employer on those grounds.
As recounted In a recent District Court of Connecticut decision, an employee testified in his own deposition that he repeatedly fell asleep during virtual meetings and responded to colleagues with “senseless babble and incoherent thoughts.”
Perhaps not suprisingly, the court granted summary judgment to the employer on both the ADA and CFEPA claims; but the decision offers some useful guidance on what it means to be “qualified” under disability discrimination law and how an employer can prevail when the interactive process breaks down.
The Facts
The Court’s decision in Belval v. Electric Boat, spells out a notable set of facts: Zacchery Belval worked for Electric Boat, the submarine manufacturer in Groton, beginning in 2017. He held the position of Mechanical Designer, supporting the design and construction of nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy. Belval has a complex medical history, including a congenital heart defect, heterotaxia, the lack of a spleen, an impaired circulatory system, and severe anxiety.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, Electric Boat sent employees home. Belval worked remotely from March 2020 through October 2021. During that time, his supervisor identified performance issues and issued verbal and written warnings. Belval disputes the performance concerns and attributes the negative feedback to retaliation for his request to continue working remotely.
When Electric Boat began calling employees back to the office, Belval requested a permanent remote work accommodation based on his medical conditions. Electric Boat worked with its Occupational Health Center and Belval’s medical provider to assess the request. Ultimately, it offered Belval the opportunity to work from home three days a week, one more day than other employees received. This was consistent with Belval’s own doctor’s recommendation, which had stated that remote work should be “strongly considered” but did not mandate full-time remote work.
Belval did not respond. Electric Boat’s OHC tried to reach him by phone multiple times. When he did pick up, he told them to speak with his attorney and refused to hear the proposed accommodation. Electric Boat sent a letter by mail informing Belval he needed to report to the OHC by August 21, 2023, or the company would consider him to have resigned. Belval says he did not receive the letter until after the deadline passed. But he concedes that even after receiving the letter, he did not contact Electric Boat. The company administratively terminated him on August 21, 2023.
Two months after his termination, Belval applied for Social Security Disability Insurance. His physician’s evaluation stated he could not work more than one hour per day, could not stand for more than 15 minutes at a time, and could not sit for more than 60 minutes at a time.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Underhill granted Electric Boat’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. The decision rests on two independent grounds, either of which would have been sufficient.
The first ground is that Belval was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA or CFEPA at the time of his termination. To bring a failure-to-accommodate claim, the employee must show that with reasonable accommodation he could perform the essential functions of his job. The court found that Belval’s own testimony defeated this element. He admitted to falling asleep in meetings and producing incoherent responses while working for another employer just one month before Electric Boat terminated him. His SSDI application, submitted two months later, included a medical evaluation finding he could only work one hour per day. The court concluded that no reasonable jury could find Belval qualified for a full-time Mechanical Designer position under those circumstances.
The second ground is that Electric Boat offered a plainly reasonable accommodation and Belval caused a breakdown in the interactive process. The employer offered three days of remote work per week, consistent with Belval’s doctor’s recommendation. The employee refused to engage, would not take phone calls, would not listen to the proposed accommodation, and did not report to the OHC by the deadline. The court found this was “manifestly the employee’s fault,” citing Second Circuit authority that such a breakdown can render a failure-to-accommodate claim frivolous.
Why This Matters
I have written many times over the years about the interactive process requirement under both the ADA and Connecticut’s CFEPA. The Connecticut Supreme Court imposed that requirement in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. way back in 2008, and the Connecticut Appellate Court has since affirmed that the obligation runs both ways. This case reinforces that principle in stark terms.
It also highlights a practical issue that employers sometimes overlook: the “qualified individual” requirement. An employee who cannot perform the essential functions of the job, even with accommodation, is not protected by the ADA or CFEPA. Employers sometimes get so focused on the accommodation question that they skip the threshold inquiry of whether the employee can actually do the work. Belval is a reminder that the qualification element has teeth.
The SSDI application is worth noting separately. Courts have long recognized that applying for disability benefits based on an inability to work can undermine, though not automatically defeat, an ADA claim. The Supreme Court addressed this years ago holding that the two positions are not inherently contradictory but that the plaintiff must offer a sufficient explanation for the inconsistency. Here, Belval offered no such explanation, and the court treated the SSDI application as additional evidence that he was not qualified.
Practical Takeaways for Employers
When you offer a reasonable accommodation and the employee will not engage, document every attempt to communicate. The employer called multiple times, spoke to the employee when he answered, sent a letter, and set a clear deadline. That paper trail made the summary judgment motion straightforward. An employer that simply stops trying after one unreturned phone call is in a weaker position.
When “Falling Asleep During Meetings” Becomes Exhibit A: Employer Wins Summary Judgment in ADA and CFEPA Case
In a classic Seinfeld episode, George Costanza once built a bed under his desk at Yankee Stadium so he could nap during the workday.
But note to future employees: Sleeping on the job can (and probably will) get you fired on the job and the courts can (and likely will) dismiss a lawsuit against the employer on those grounds.
As recounted in a recent District Court of Connecticut decision, an employee testified in his own deposition that he repeatedly fell asleep during virtual meetings and responded to colleagues with “senseless babble and incoherent thoughts.”
Perhaps not surprisingly, the court granted summary judgment to the employer on both the ADA and CFEPA claims; but the decision offers some useful guidance on what it means to be “qualified” under disability discrimination law and how an employer can prevail when the interactive process breaks down.
The Facts
The court’s decision in Belval v. Electric Boat spells out a notable set of facts: Zacchery Belval worked for Electric Boat, the submarine manufacturer in Groton, beginning in 2017. He held the position of Mechanical Designer, supporting the design and construction of nuclear submarines for the U.S. Navy. Belval has a complex medical history, including a congenital heart defect, heterotaxia, the lack of a spleen, an impaired circulatory system, and severe anxiety.
When the COVID-19 pandemic hit, Electric Boat sent employees home. Belval worked remotely from March 2020 through October 2021. During that time, his supervisor identified performance issues and issued verbal and written warnings. Belval disputes the performance concerns and attributes the negative feedback to retaliation for his request to continue working remotely.
When Electric Boat began calling employees back to the office, Belval requested a permanent remote work accommodation based on his medical conditions. Electric Boat worked with its Occupational Health Center and Belval’s medical provider to assess the request. Ultimately, it offered Belval the opportunity to work from home three days a week, one more day than other employees received. This was consistent with Belval’s own doctor’s recommendation, which had stated that remote work should be “strongly considered” but did not mandate full-time remote work.
Belval did not respond. Electric Boat’s OHC tried to reach him by phone multiple times. When he did pick up, he told them to speak with his attorney and refused to hear the proposed accommodation. Electric Boat sent a letter by mail informing Belval he needed to report to the OHC by August 21, 2023, or the company would consider him to have resigned. Belval says he did not receive the letter until after the deadline passed. But he concedes that even after receiving the letter, he did not contact Electric Boat. The company administratively terminated him on August 21, 2023.
Two months after his termination, Belval applied for Social Security Disability Insurance. His physician’s evaluation stated he could not work more than one hour per day, could not stand for more than 15 minutes at a time, and could not sit for more than 60 minutes at a time.
The Court’s Holding
Judge Underhill granted Electric Boat’s motion for summary judgment on all counts. The decision rests on two independent grounds, either of which would have been sufficient.
First, Belval was not a “qualified individual” under the ADA or CFEPA at the time of his termination. The court found that Belval’s own testimony defeated this element. He admitted to falling asleep in meetings and producing incoherent responses while working for another employer just one month before Electric Boat terminated him. His SSDI application, submitted two months later, included a medical evaluation finding he could only work one hour per day. No reasonable jury could find Belval qualified for a full-time Mechanical Designer position under those circumstances.
Second, Electric Boat offered a plainly reasonable accommodation and Belval caused a breakdown in the interactive process. The employer offered three days of remote work per week, consistent with Belval’s doctor’s recommendation. The employee refused to engage, would not take phone calls, would not listen to the proposed accommodation, and did not report to the OHC by the deadline. The court found this was “manifestly the employee’s fault,” citing Second Circuit authority that such a breakdown can render a failure-to-accommodate claim frivolous.
Why This Matters
I have written many times over the years about the interactive process requirement under both the ADA and Connecticut’s CFEPA. The Connecticut Supreme Court imposed that requirement in Curry v. Allan S. Goodman, Inc. way back in 2008, and the Connecticut Appellate Court has since affirmed that the obligation runs both ways. This case reinforces that principle in stark terms.
It also highlights a practical issue that employers sometimes overlook: the “qualified individual” requirement. An employee who cannot perform the essential functions of the job, even with accommodation, is not protected by the ADA or CFEPA. Employers sometimes get so focused on the accommodation question that they skip the threshold inquiry of whether the employee can actually do the work. Belval is a reminder that the qualification element has teeth.
The SSDI application is worth noting separately. Courts have long recognized that applying for disability benefits based on an inability to work can undermine, though not automatically defeat, an ADA claim. The Supreme Court addressed this years ago, holding that the two positions are not inherently contradictory but that the plaintiff must offer a sufficient explanation for the inconsistency. Here, Belval offered no such explanation, and the court treated the SSDI application as additional evidence that he was not qualified.
Practical Takeaways for Employers
When you offer a reasonable accommodation and the employee will not engage, document every attempt to communicate. The employer here called multiple times, spoke to the employee when he answered, sent a letter, and set a clear deadline. That paper trail made the summary judgment motion straightforward. An employer that simply stops trying after one unreturned phone call is in a weaker position.
Pay attention to whether the employee can actually do the job. If an employee’s medical condition has progressed to the point where no accommodation will enable performance of essential functions, you may have a defense on the “qualified individual” element. But be careful: this requires evidence, not assumptions. The employee’s own deposition testimony and SSDI application provided the evidence here. The employer did not have to guess.
If an employee applies for SSDI or long-term disability benefits while simultaneously claiming the ability to work with accommodation, note the inconsistency. You do not need to resolve it unilaterally. But if the matter proceeds to litigation, the benefits application may become relevant evidence.The draft is ready. A few notes on the choices I made:
The Costanza reference is brief, natural, and does not overstay its welcome. It sets up the “sleeping during meetings” fact, which is genuinely the most striking detail in the case and the hook that makes readers stop scrolling.
The real substance is the two independent grounds for summary judgment: the qualification question (Belval’s own testimony and SSDI application) and the interactive process breakdown. I gave both full treatment because each offers distinct practical guidance.
I linked back to two prior posts that are genuinely relevant: the 2008 Curry v. Allan S. Goodman post on the interactive process requirement under CFEPA, and the 2023 post affirming that the process runs both ways. Both are squarely on point.
On the “sleeping on the job” framing you requested: the case is less about sleeping as a basis for termination and more about sleeping as evidence that the employee could not perform essential functions. I calibrated the post to reflect that accurately while still using the sleeping testimony as the attention-grabbing hook. The practical significance for employers is in understanding that an employee’s own admissions about incapacity can be dispositive at summary judgment.
Let me know if you want adjustments to emphasis, tone, or length.
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