Today’s case, Schmidt v. Dexcom, Inc., 2026 WL 2244106 (E.D. Mich. Aug 2, 2026), involves a glucose monitoring device (the “G6”) and a pretty bad day for the plaintiff—both in terms of how he somehow managed to get a needle stuck in his arm when the device doesn’t go there and the shellacking he received in the opinion. The G6 device consists of an applicator, sensor and transmitter. The applicator deploys a needle and inserts the sensor under the skin, and the needle then retracts back into the applicator. Although the device is indicated for insertion in the abdomen, plaintiff claimed that the needle completely dislodged in his arm, requiring surgery and resulting in permanent scarring and disfigurement. The defense moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff failed to establish personal jurisdiction, that the claim was preempted, and in the alternative to compel arbitration. Spoiler alert—plaintiff lost all three.
The court first addressed jurisdiction. Starting with general jurisdiction, the defendant was not incorporated in and did not maintain its principal place of business in Michigan, so there was nothing to indicate general jurisdiction would apply. Plaintiff opposed the motion by arguing that the defendant’s business in Michigan was “continuous and systematic,” but that allegation wasn’t included in the complaint, and it wasn’t enough to show that the defendant’s activities in Michigan were so pervasive that it would effectively be “at home” in Michigan. Id. at *4.
Turning to specific jurisdiction, the complaint referenced the defendant’s action of placing the G6 device into the stream of commerce, but it went no further. It did not claim that the defendant purposely availed itself of the privilege of doing business in Michigan, and it did not allege that the injuries arose out of the defendant’s activities in Michigan. Plaintiff argued in his opposition that the defendant “marketed, sold, and procured for use the G6 in Michigan,” but that information was not in the complaint and, “inexplicably,” plaintiff’s counsel did not request leave to amend the complaint or submit an affidavit in support of personal jurisdiction. Id. Given that, the court held that the plaintiff “did not allege facts to establish personal jurisdiction with reasonable particularity, and it is within the prerogative of this Court to dismiss this action for that failure.” Id.
You’re probably wondering whether the court granted plaintiff leave to amend. It didn’t. Why? Because the plaintiff “failed to meaningfully contest any of the Defendant’s other arguments in support of arbitration or [preemption]. Even if personal jurisdiction were proper, the Court would have compelled arbitration or dismissed the case anyway.” Id. at *5.
Arbitration was an issue because the G6 device was designed to work with a display device that showed the user’s glucose data. That display is typically the user’s smartphone, and to set that up the user has to create an account with the defendant and agree to certain terms of use that include an arbitration requirement. Plaintiff set up such an account, and in doing so accepted the defendant’s terms of use and arbitration clause. Defendant argued that, if the court found personal jurisdiction, it should compel arbitration because of the mandatory arbitration clause which covered all aspects of any dispute between the plaintiff and defendant—including tort claims. Plaintiff claimed he did not agree to the terms of use, but the court found that “plainly untrue.” Id. at *5. The defendant submitted affidavits showing that anyone accepting the terms of use accepted the arbitration clause and that the plaintiff himself accepted the terms. Plaintiff argued that there was no evidence of his signature on any agreement to arbitrate, but that is not required. Michigan requires only “some unequivocal act sufficient to demonstrate acceptance,” and “clicking a box” like the plaintiff did was sufficient. Id. at *6. As a result, the court held that, even if there was personal jurisdiction, it would compel arbitration. (If this gets you wondering about arbitration clauses in the medical device context, here’s a prior post on the topic).
As if that weren’t enough, the court also held that, if there was personal jurisdiction and the court declined to compel arbitration, it would still dismiss the case based on the defendant’s preemption arguments. Two years ago we posted about Dickson v. Dexcom, Inc., 2024 WL 3417392 (W.D. La. July 15, 2024), which was the first decision holding that 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) preempts claims challenging the safety and effectiveness of a Class II medical device approved by the FDA through the “de novo classification” process. Dickson involved the same device here (the G6), and the defendant relied heavily on it and two later cases holding that claims involving the G6 device were preempted. See Dickson v. Dexcom, Inc., 2024 WL 4291511 (W.D. La. Sept. 25, 2024) (dismissing failure to warn claims as preempted, which we blogged about here) and Higginbottom v. Dexcom, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 3d 1058 (S.D. Cal. 2024) (dismissing design, manufacturing and warning claims related to the G6 device based on preemption, and which we blogged about here).
Although the court did not provide much analysis on the question of preemption, it contrasted the defendant’s “meticulous” argument about preemption against plaintiff’s failure to “meaningfully contest” any of those arguments. Given plaintiff’s failures, the court “would not allow Plaintiff a chance to amend his complaint to fix the deficiencies pertaining to personal jurisdiction due to his failure to meaningfully contest the other bases for relief that Defendant identified.” Id. at *7.
Since the court held that the plaintiff failed to allege facts sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction, it dismissed the complaint without prejudice. But the court’s refusal to allow plaintiff an opportunity to amend, along with its “belt and suspenders” discussion of arbitration and preemption, should mean we won’t see this one again.
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