Sometimes we get a little tired of plaintiffs’ antics in bringing multi-plaintiff complaints to defeat diversity jurisdiction or tilt the scales in their favor at trial. Federal courts are generally wise to this maneuver (see our prior posts here, here and here), but there’s a never ending battle to avoid multi-plaintiff actions in some of the familiar state court haunts (St. Louis and Philly come to mind). So, when we see a state trial court decision shooting down a multi-plaintiff complaint at the outset, we get excited.
Palmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 2026 WL 300105 (Conn. Super. Oct. 9, 2026), involves claims by four plaintiffs who filed a lawsuit together claiming that their use of an injectable contraceptive caused them to develop meningioma (a type of brain tumor). The four plaintiffs were from different states (New York, Kentucky, Louisiana and Connecticut), they received their injections at different times, and the injections they received were different combinations of brand and generic versions. The defendant moved to strike the complaint based on improper joinder. The defendant argued both that (1) the plaintiffs themselves were improperly joined, and (2) that the plaintiffs’ claims were improperly joined.
The court started its analysis by noting that the Connecticut Supreme Court has historically “taken a liberal approach to permissive joinder.” Id. at *3. The court then looked to Connecticut law to determine the proper inquiry for addressing defendant’s misjoinder arguments. To determine whether plaintiffs are misjoined, Connecticut law requires a three-part inquiry:
- Do the plaintiffs have any “right of relief” “arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions” that are alleged?
- If the plaintiffs brought separate actions, would “any common question of law or fact” arise? and
- Would joinder “embarrass or delay the trial”?
Id. (quoting Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-104). After concluding that Connecticut courts take a broad view of what constitutes a “transaction” and that courts should consider the interests of judicial economy in evaluating the statute, the court noted a paucity of caselaw in Connecticut determining whether different plaintiffs’ rights of relief arose from the same “transaction” in the context of pharmaceutical cases. The court then reviewed a number of federal decisions that rejected joinder of multiple plaintiffs in a single complaint:
- In re Zantac (Ranitidine) Products Liability Litigation, 343 F.R.D. 347, 351 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 7, 2023) (denying a motion to permit multi-plaintiff complaints where “the Plaintiffs, each with unique physiology, consumed a drug created by different manufacturers, using different supply chains, at different times, in different places, with varying levels of exposure”).
- In re Orthopedic Bone Screw Products Liability Litigation, 1995 WL 428683 (E.D. Pa. July 15, 1995) (“joinder based on the belief that the same occurrence or transaction is satisfied by the fact that claimants have the same or similar device of a defendant manufacturer implanted in or about their spine is . . . not a proper joinder”).
- In re Propecia (Finasteride) Product Liability Litigation, 2013 WL 3729570 (E.D.N.Y. May 17, 2013) (54 plaintiffs who ingested a prescription product and suffered injuries had not alleged claims that arose from the same transaction or occurrence because their claims differed as to the product, dosage amounts and frequency, dates of ingestion, duration of ingestion and location of purchase and ingestion).
- McNaughton v. Merck & Co., Inc., 2004 WL 5180726 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 17, 2024) (plaintiffs alleging improper warnings about a medicine raised common issues but their claims did not arise from the same transaction or occurrence).
Id. at *6-7. While recognizing that these cases showed a clear trend against joinder of plaintiffs in cases involving drugs or medical devices, the court flagged the limitations imposed on it at the motion to strike stage:
Notably, the federal cases that have considered whether the plaintiffs’ exposure to pharmaceuticals or medical devices were not decided under the narrow rules that apply to motions to strike in Connecticut state courts. Most of them were considering defendants’ motions to sever plaintiffs’ claims or plaintiffs’ motions to remand to state court for lack of diversity jurisdiction. This court is limited to the facts alleged in the . . . complaint, which it must construe in the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency.
Id. at *8. In other words, in considering only the allegations in the complaint, the court couldn’t inject a dose of reality (pun intended) by recognizing the variables highlighted in the federal cases that weighed against joinder. With that important caveat, the court concluded the allegations in the complaint sufficiently alleged the same “transaction.” The court also concluded that the allegations in the complaint sufficiently alleged claims from which “common questions of law or fact would arise.” Id. at *9.
But, plaintiffs couldn’t get past the third element of the court’s inquiry—whether joinder would “embarrass or delay the trial.” Applying that part of the inquiry, the court held:
The use of the somewhat archaic word “embarrass” in the statute and rule could mean “to hamper or impede the movement” of the trial. The differences among the plaintiffs’ facts, particularly as to treatment and injuries, are enough that combining them all into one case (1) would increase the amount of discovery to be undertaken (including discovery outside of Connecticut for three of the plaintiffs), (2) could raise different issues for summary judgment, (3) delay the trial date, and (4) create jury confusion at trial. Although it might be convenient to hear some issues such as general causation together in preliminary hearings . . . it would not be convenient to combine the causes of action into one trial.
Id. at *12. So even under Connecticut’s restrictive standard at the motion to strike phase, the court held that the plaintiffs were misjoined. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ claims were misjoined based on it being inconvenient for the court to hear the causes of action together. The court’s rejection of multi-plaintiff joinder at the outset of this case is an encouraging sign of the growing recognition of the confusion, delay, complexity and unfairness posed by multi-plaintiff drug and device cases.
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