Sapp-Gooding v Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP 2026 NY Slip Op 06159 October 21, 2026
Appellate Division, Second Department is a legal malpractice case in which Plaintiff asked for more time to serve the summons and complaint in a case involving the World Trade Center .
Calvin Gooding (hereinafter the decedent) died in the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center. He was survived by his wife, the plaintiff Rhonda Sapp-Gooding, and two children, the plaintiffs Celia Rose Gooding and Zaya Gooding. In 2002, the defendant Kreindler & Kreindler, LLP (hereinafter the Kreindler firm), commenced an action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on behalf of thousands of 9/11 victims and their families, Ashton v Al Qaeda Islamic Army (No. 02-cv-06977 [hereinafter the Ashton I action]). On August 1, 2003, the Kreindler firm, under the belief that Sapp-Gooding would be signing and returning a retainer agreement, included her in the Ashton I action “as Personal Representative of the Estate of [the decedent], Deceased and on behalf of all survivors of [the decedent].” In 2015, the Kreindler firm successfully moved for leave to enter a default judgment against the Islamic Republic of Iran on the issue of liability in favor of all the plaintiffs in the Ashton 1 action. After that motion was granted, the Kreindler firm also sought a final judgment in favor of the decedent’s estate and against the Islamic Republic of Iran in the principal sum of $8,880,000. In 2017, the Kreindler firm commenced a second action in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Ashton v Kingdom of Saudia Arabia (No. 17-cv-02003 [hereinafter the Ashton II action]), and again included Sapp-Gooding, individually and on behalf of the decedent’s estate, in the consolidated complaint. Sapp-Gooding, however, never signed or returned the retainer agreement and had no contact with the Kreindler firm between 2003 and 2020.
In 2019, Congress passed the United States Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund Clarification Act (Pub L 116-69, § 1701, 133 US Stat 1134, 1140-1143), which expanded access to the Victims of State Sponsored Terrorism Fund (hereinafter VSSTF) to 9/11 victims, spouses, and dependents who obtained a final judgment against a state sponsor of terrorism. Thereafter, Sapp-Gooding retained counsel who discovered that the Kreindler firm was representing her in the Ashton I action. After counsel was unsuccessful in obtaining VSSTF benefits, the plaintiffs signed and returned retainer agreements with the Kreindler firm in February 2021. The Kreindler firm obtained final judgments in favor of the plaintiffs in the Ashton I action in the principal sum of $43,080,791, including an award of $12,500,000 in favor of Sapp-Gooding and $13,580,791 in favor of the decedent’s estate. However, the plaintiffs were only able to recover the sums of $6,359.46 on behalf of Sapp-Gooding and $6,909.32 on behalf of the decedent’s estate from the VSSTF, or approximately .0626% of their eligible damages.
On July 25, 2023, Sapp-Gooding commenced this action against, among others, the Kreindler firm and the defendants James P. Kreindler and Megan Wolfe Benett by filing a summons with notice. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed a complaint asserting causes of action against the Kreindler firm, Kreindler, Benett, and nonparties Noah Kushlefsky and Andrew Maloney (hereinafter collectively the Kreindler attorneys), including a cause of action to recover damages for legal malpractice. The complaint alleged that had the Kreindler attorneys obtained final judgments in the Ashton I action and filed VSSTF applications on behalf of the plaintiffs before February 19, 2020, the plaintiffs would have received 5.8574% of their eligible damages from the VSSTF.
On June 26, 2024, the plaintiffs moved pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend the time to serve the summons with notice upon the Kreindler attorneys. On July 29, 2024, the Kreindler attorneys cross-moved pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the complaint. In an order dated September 11, 2024, the Supreme Court, inter alia, granted the plaintiffs’ motion and denied that branch of the Kreindler attorneys’ cross-motion which was pursuant to CPLR 3211(a) to dismiss the cause of action alleging legal malpractice. The Kreindler attorneys appeal.”
“Here, the Kreindler attorneys satisfied their initial burden of demonstrating that the alleged legal malpractice accrued, at the latest, on February 19, 2020, the third deadline for VSSTF applications, which was more than three years prior to the commencement of this action (see Tulino v Hiller, P.C., 202 AD3d 1132, 1135; Schrull v Weis, 166 AD3d 829, 832). In opposition, however, the plaintiffs raised questions of fact as to whether there was a mutual understanding of the need for further representation (see Lytell v Lorusso, 74 AD3d 905, 907; cf. Verkowitz v Ursprung, 153 AD3d 1443, 1444; Landow v Snow Becker Krauss, P.C., 111 AD3d 795, 796-797) and whether the Kreindler attorneys engaged in a course of continuous representation intended to rectify or mitigate the alleged malpractice (see Stein Indus., Inc. v Certilman Balin Adler & Hyman, LLP, 149 AD3d at 790; DeStaso v Condon Resnick, LLP, 90 AD3d at 812-813; Gravel v Cicola, 297 AD2d 620, 621). Therefore, the Supreme Court properly denied dismissal of the cause of action alleging legal malpractice pursuant to CPLR 3211(a)(5).
“Pursuant to CPLR 306-b, a court may, in the exercise of discretion, grant an extension of time within which to effect service for good cause shown or in the interest of justice” (Bhatara v Kolaj, 222 AD3d 926, 930 [internal quotation marks omitted]). “The more flexible interest of justice standard accommodates late service that might be due to mistake, confusion, or oversight, so long as there is no prejudice to the defendant” (id.). Here, the plaintiffs demonstrated that the action was timely commenced, that service was timely attempted, that they had a potentially meritorious cause of action, and that there was no demonstrable prejudice to the Kreindler attorneys as a consequence of the delay in service. Under the circumstances of this case, the Supreme Court providently exercised its discretion in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 306-b to extend the time to serve the summons with notice upon the Kreindler attorneys in the interest of justice (see Bank of N.Y. v Hernandez, 243 AD3d 854, 856; Bhatara v Kolaj, 222 AD3d at 931).”
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