On October 14, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Salazar v. Paramount Global (No. 25-459), a case considering who qualifies as a “consumer” under the Video Privacy Protection Act (VPPA). Although enacted in 1988 to protect the privacy of video-rental records, the VPPA has become an increasingly prominent vehicle for privacy class actions challenging the disclosure of online video-viewing information. Plaintiffs have invoked the decades-old statute against modern websites and digital platforms, often alleging that tracking technologies improperly transmit users’ viewing information to third parties. In Salazar, the Court is considering whether the phrase “goods or services from a video tape service provider” used in the VPPA’s definition of “consumer” “refers to all of a video tape service provider’s goods or services or only to its audiovisual goods or services.” The answer could substantially affect which website users may sue under the statute—and, correspondingly, the exposure of businesses that offer video content alongside other products or services.
Enacted after the disclosure of Supreme Court nominee Judge Robert Bork’s video-rental history during his confirmation hearings in 1987, the VPPA imposes civil liability on any “video tape service provider” that knowingly discloses the “personally identifiable information” of any “consumer of such provider” except as otherwise permitted by the statute. 18 U.S.C. § 2710(b)(1). A “consumer” is defined as someone who rents, purchases, or subscribes to “goods or services from a video tape service provider.” Id. § 2710(a)(1). The statute separately defines “personally identifiable information” to include information identifying a person as having requested or obtained specific video materials or services. Id. § 2710(a)(3). The dispute in Salazar turns on the relationship between these definitions, namely whether the goods or services that establish a person’s status as a “consumer” must themselves be audiovisual, or whether a subscription to any of the provider’s offerings is sufficient.
Here, Salazar signed up for a free online newsletter from a sports website owned and operated by Paramount. He alleged that, after he watched videos on that website, Paramount shared data about his viewing history with Facebook without his consent. Salazar brought a putative class action under the VPPA, asserting that his newsletter subscription qualified him as a statutory “consumer” even though the subscription itself was not for audiovisual content. In a split decision affirming the district court’s dismissal of Salazar’s complaint, the Sixth Circuit reasoned that the VPPA’s definition of “consumer” includes only those who subscribe to audiovisual materials (which Salazar did not allege). Under that interpretation, merely subscribing to a website’s newsletter does not confer VPPA protection, even when the website also makes videos available to its subscribers.
At oral argument, Salazar urged the Court to reject this narrow reading, asserting that Congress knew how to impose an audiovisual limitation (as it had in other VPPA definitions) but did not do so here. In his view, the statute’s unqualified reference to “goods or services” encompasses any subscription relationship with a qualifying video tape service provider. Reading an audiovisual limitation into that definition, he argued, would impose a restriction Congress chose not to include. On the other hand, Paramount argued that the statute’s other definitions make clear it was designed to provide a cause of action only for subscribers to audiovisual materials. Paramount maintained that the phrase must be understood in its statutory context, rather than in isolation, and that Congress enacted the VPPA to protect consumers of video-related goods and services—not every individual who happens to subscribe to an unrelated offering from a business that also provides videos.
The Justices’ questions exposed the tension between these competing approaches to statutory interpretation. Some Justices seemed hesitant to embrace Salazar’s broad approach. Justice Thomas questioned whether it would be natural to understand “goods or services from a video tape provider” as referring specifically to video-related goods or services. Both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Jackson explored how the VPPA’s original purpose should inform the interpretation of its text. Justice Jackson in particular seemed dissatisfied with Salazar’s suggestion that the Court “live with th[e] mystery” of why the VPPA contains different definitions. And Justice Kavanaugh seemed wary of “repurposing” the VPPA to cover data sharing on the modern Internet instead of the disclosure of individuals’ videotape viewing history. These exchanges suggested concern that Salazar’s interpretation could extend a statute enacted to address a specific privacy problem to commercial relationships far removed from the video-rental transactions Congress originally contemplated.
Yet the Justices did not spare Paramount. Justice Kagan, for example, pressed Paramount with a largely textual argument that Salazar was just “following the definitions where they lead.” Her questioning highlighted a potential weakness in Paramount’s position: that Congress expressly incorporated audiovisual limitations into certain VPPA definitions but omitted comparable language from the definition of “consumer.” That difference raises the question whether courts may narrow an otherwise broad statutory definition by relying on the statute’s overall subject matter and purpose.
The argument, thus, revealed no obvious consensus. Although several Justices appeared concerned about expanding the VPPA beyond its original setting, others questioned whether Paramount’s proposed limitation could be reconciled with the language Congress actually enacted. The competing concerns make it difficult to predict whether the Court will adopt a narrower, context-driven interpretation or give controlling weight to the breadth of the statutory definition.
Oral argument also brought into focus several additional VPPA issues that could shape future litigation regardless of how the Court resolves the question presented. Several Justices, including Justices Alito and Sotomayor, devoted considerable attention to the meaning of the phrase “in the business of” in the statute’s definition of a “video tape service provider.” Their probing questions suggest that, even if the Court accepts Salazar’s broader interpretation of the definition of “consumer,” some Justices may be open to a narrower interpretation of “video tape service provider” that would limit which businesses are subject to the statute. Under this distinction, a plaintiff may qualify as a “consumer” under a broad reading of that term but still lack a viable VPPA claim if the defendant does not qualify as a covered provider.
Other Justices asked about consent to disclosure, the meaning of “personally identifiable information,” and standing. The standing questions are particularly noteworthy given the uncertainty surrounding Article III standing in privacy litigation following TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021). In TransUnion, the Supreme Court held that a statutory violation, by itself, does not establish the concrete injury necessary for standing in federal court. Rather, a plaintiff alleging an intangible injury must identify a close relationship between the asserted harm and one traditionally recognized as actionable at common law. Although the Court recognized that disclosure of private information can constitute a concrete injury, lower courts have reached differing conclusions about how that framework applies to alleged privacy violations involving the disclosure of personal information through digital tracking technologies. The distinction matters in VPPA litigation, where plaintiffs frequently seek statutory damages based on alleged disclosures of video-viewing information without alleging additional financial or consequential harm. The Supreme Court’s questions highlighted an issue that could remain important even if the Court adopts a broad definition of “consumer,” namely whether the alleged particular disclosure establishes a sufficiently concrete privacy injury under TransUnion. Those questions underscore that consumer status is only one element of a viable VPPA claim. Even if Salazar prevails, plaintiffs must still establish that the defendant is a covered provider, the information allegedly disclosed falls within the statute’s protections, the disclosure violated the VPPA’s requirements, and that the plaintiff satisfies applicable standing requirements. Because the question presented in Salazar concerns the statutory definition of “consumer,” rather than Article III standing, the Court may leave unresolved the broader disagreement over when an alleged disclosure of personal information constitutes a concrete injury. The Court’s resolution of the consumer-definition question, therefore, may not settle the broader disputes driving VPPA litigation.
For businesses that offer video content online, the practical implications extend beyond the outcome of this particular case. A ruling for Salazar could broaden the universe of potential plaintiffs, particularly where businesses provide newsletters, memberships, or other non-video subscriptions alongside video content. That result could increase litigation exposure arising from the use of website analytics, advertising technologies, and third-party tracking tools. Conversely, a ruling for Paramount could provide an important limitation on VPPA claims by requiring a closer connection between a plaintiff’s subscription relationship and the provider’s audiovisual offerings.
The Supreme Court’s upcoming opinion may have a significant impact on the scope of plaintiffs eligible to bring VPPA class actions based on alleged unauthorized disclosures of their online video-viewing information. On one hand, a decision affirming the Sixth Circuit’s audiovisual limit could significantly narrow the field of potential plaintiffs and curtail the VPPA as a major tool of the plaintiffs’ privacy class action bar. On the other hand, a decision in Salazar’s favor could preserve—and potentially expand—the statute’s role in modern privacy litigation.
Based on oral argument, it is unclear which way the Court will rule. But even if the Court rules in Salazar’s favor, the Justices’ questions suggest that defendants may have substantial arguments available under other provisions of the VPPA. The definition of a covered provider, the scope of protected information, consent, and standing may become increasingly important battlegrounds in the lower courts. In that respect, Salazar may prove significant not only for the question it resolves, but also for the questions it leaves open.
For more information, contact Chantel Febus, James Azadian, Melanie Chico, Andrew VanEgmond, Ted Seitz, or Mike Mezey.
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