COURT OF APPEAL SUMMARIES (NOVEMBER 2 – NOVEMBER 6)

In Phixaykoune v. Ontario, the Court allowed an appeal from an order denying leave to pursue negligence claims against correctional officers under s. 17 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019. The Court held that a negligence claim that includes factual allegations of bad faith, made to defeat good faith statutory immunity, is not a claim in respect of “a tort based on bad faith”, thus s. 17 did not apply and leave was not required. The negligence claims against the correctional officers could therefore be pursued without leave.

In Poirier v. 2621892 Ontario Inc., the appellant was assaulted outside a bar. He settled with the respondent, agreeing not to add him as a defendant, in exchange for his affidavit evidence and cooperation as a witness at trial. The appellant later tried to add the respondent as a defendant, claiming that the affidavit evidence the respondent provided was demonstrably falseThe Court upheld the motion judge’s enforcement of the settlement agreement and his finding that the appellant reneged on the agreement by seeking to add the respondent as a defendant. The appellant was aware that the respondent claimed he was not involved in the altercation and had the video evidence that could allegedly prove the contrary before the agreement was made.

In F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited, the Court of Appeal allowed a franchisor’s appeal, holding that the application judge erred by finding the franchise agreement’s restrictive covenants ambiguous without interpreting them in the context of the agreement as a whole. Deciding reasonableness on the record before it, the Court held the non-competition clause unenforceable as overly broad, but found the non-solicitation clause reasonable and enforceable, and that it was breached by the former franchisees.

In Jordan v. Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group, the Court dismissed the appeal from the dismissal of an action by way of the granting of a non-suit motion at the end of the plaintiffs’ case at trial. The Court agreed there was no evidence to support the plaintiffs’ claims and the trial judge was right in granting the non-suit motion. While his reasons for decision were light, they did not prevent meaningful appellate review. The Court granted leave to appeal the costs order and allowed the cross-appeal on costs. The $10,000 in costs awarded to each defendant was too low and the Court awarded them more than four times that amount to each defendant on a partial indemnity scale.

In Bratusa v. Doersam, the Court allowed an appeal from an order staying an application for dependant support under the Succession Law Reform Act on the basis that the Ontario court lacked jurisdiction. The Court held that a dependant support claim is more akin to a claim for support in the family law context than a tort claim, and that the claimant’s residence at the time the claim is made is a presumptive connecting factor. Given the appellants’ residence and ties to Ontario, and that the estate’s primary remaining assets were life insurance policies established in Ontario, the Court found a real and substantial connection and concluded that Ontario had jurisdiction over the claim.

Wishing everyone an enjoyable weekend.

John Polyzogopoulos
Blaney McMurtry LLP
416.593.2953 Email

Table of Contents

Civil Decisions

Phixaykoune v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 773

Keywords: Torts, Crown Liability, Negligence, Bad Faith, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Leave to Commence Action, Amending Pleadings, Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, ss. 11, 17(1), 17(2), 17(7), 17(9), 17(10), Ministry of Correctional Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.22, s. 12(1), Smarter and Stronger Justice Act, 2020, Sched. 7, s. 1, Phixaykoune v. Ontario, 2024 ONSC 3860, Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 27, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Poorkid Investments Inc. v. Ontario (Solicitor General), 2023 ONCA 172, Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, Sunil S. Mathai & Brent Kettles, The Annotated Ontario Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2024), Karen Horsman and Gareth Morley, Government Liability: Law and Practice (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2020)

Poirier v. 2621892 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 788

Keywords: Torts, Assault, Battery, Contracts, Settlement Agreements, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Amending Pleadings, Adding Parties, Crosstown Transit Constructors v. METROLINX, 2019 ONCA 240, Remedy Drug Store Co. v. Farnham, 2015 ONCA 576

F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited, 2026 ONCA 775

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Franchise Agreements, Restrictive Covenants, Non-Competition, Non-Solicitation, Enforceability, Restraint of Trade, Presumption of Unenforceability, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134, Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, s. 67.2, Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2095, M & P Drug Mart Inc. v. Norton, 2022 ONCA 398, Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Orillia (City) v. Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited, 2021 ONCA 291, Elsley v. J.G. Collins Ins. Agencies, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, Payette v. Guay inc., 2013 SCC 45, MEDIchair LP v. DME Medequip Inc., 2016 ONCA 168, Dr. C. Sims Dentistry Professional Corporation v. Cooke, 2024 ONCA 388, Martin v. ConCreate USL Limited Partnership, 2013 ONCA 72, Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, Weyerhaeuser Company Limited v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 1007, rev’d 2019 SCC 60, Dumbrell v. The Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59, Chilton v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co. (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), Amberber v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2018 ONCA 571, 1401380 Ontario Limited (Wilderness North Air) v. Hydro One Remote Communities Inc., 2025 ONCA 827, Craig v. CEO Global Network Inc., 2019 ONSC 3589, Mason v. Chem-Trend Limited Partnership, 2011 ONCA 344, H.L. Staebler Company Ltd. v. Allan, 2008 ONCA 576, Lyons v. Multari (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 526 (C.A.)

Jordan v. Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group, 2026 ONCA 795

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Bad Faith, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Limitation Periods, Trials, Non-Suit, Procedural and Natural Justice, Sufficiency of Reasons, Costs, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 148, Statutory Condition 11, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 131, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 49.10, 49.13, 57, 57.01, 76, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, FL Receivables Trust 2022-A v. Cobrand Foods, 2007 ONCA 425, Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73, Denman v. Radovanovic, 2024 ONCA 276, Krawchuk v. Sherbak, 2011 ONCA 352, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 319, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Fernandez v. Norseman Inc., 2026 ONCA 716, Algra v. Comrie Estate, 2023 ONCA 811, Dermann v. Baker, 2019 ONCA 584, S & A Strasser Ltd. v. Richmond Hill (Town) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 243 (C.A.), James v. HSBC Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 440, James v. HSBC Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 440, More v. 1362279 Ontario Ltd. (Seiko Homes), 2023 ONCA 527

Bratusa v. Doersam, 2026 ONCA 792

Keywords: Family Law, Wills and Estates, Dependants’ Support, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Real and Substantial Connection, Residence, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c., Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, Doersam v. Doersam, 2022 ONSC 4095, Kyko Global Inc. v. M/S Crawford Bayley & Co., 2021 ONCA 736, Sinclair v. Venezio Turismo, 2025 SCC 27, Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Wang v. Lin, 2013 ONCA 33, UD Trading Group Holding PTE. Limited v. TransAsia Private Capital Limited, 2021 ONCA 279, Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116, Parrish v. Navarro, 2014 ONCA 856, Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393

Short Civil Decisions

Sitzer Group Holdings No. 1 Limited v. Grall Corporation Limited, 2026 ONCA 783

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Arbitration Agreements, Civil Procedure, Arbitrations, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, ss. 45, 46, Ottawa (City) v. Coliseum Inc., 2016 ONCA 363, Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Carpenters and Allied Workers Local 27 et al. (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 472 (C.A.)

Arabi v. Al-Sahnawi, 2026 ONCA 787

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Trials, Evidence, Admissibility, Witnesses, Cross-Examinations, Rule in Browne v Dunn, Browne v. Dunn, (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.)

Beechhill Capital Corp. v. P2P Green Power Energy Solutions Inc., 2026 ONCA 786

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Defences, Equitable Set-Off, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

Im v. Elias-Haghighi, 2026 ONCA 785

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Settlements

McFadden v. Timmins (City), 2026 ONCA 794

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

Narouz c. Fisgard Capital Corporation, 2026 ONCA 793

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Torts, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Counterclaims, Summary Judgment

Tomas v. Turnbull, 2026 ONCA 784

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Self-Represented Litigants, Rules of Civil Procedure, Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23

Perez-Youssoufian Medicine Professional Corporation v. Liu, 2026 ONCA 804

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

CIVIL DECISIONS

Phixaykoune v. Ontario, 2026 ONCA 773

[Fairburn, Rouleau, Roberts JJ.A.]

Counsel:

N.G. Wilson and M.M. Coker, for the appellant

J. Coristine, for the respondents

Keywords: Torts, Crown Liability, Negligence, Bad Faith, Statutory Interpretation, Civil Procedure, Leave to Commence Action, Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, S.O. 2019, c. 7, Sched. 17, s. 17, Ministry of Correctional Services Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. M.22, s. 12(1), Mustapha v. Culligan of Canada Ltd., 2008 SCC 2, Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, Poorkid Investments Inc. v. Ontario (Solicitor General), 2023 ONCA 172, leave to appeal refused, [2023] S.C.C.A. No. 188, Alberta v. Elder Advocates of Alberta Society, 2011 SCC 24, Sunil S. Mathai & Brent Kettles, The Annotated Ontario Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2024), Karen Horsman and Gareth Morley, Government Liability: Law and Practice (Toronto: Thomson Reuters Canada Ltd., 2020)

facts:

The appellant was badly beaten by other inmates while detained at the Maplehurst Correctional Complex. Surveillance video showed that, within seconds of a group of correctional officers leaving the unit, three inmates assaulted him and pushed him to the ground, where his head struck the concrete floor with significant force and he appeared to be unconscious. No correctional officers came to his assistance. Other inmates dragged him under the stairs, poured water on him and put him in the shower. Nearly an hour and forty minutes after they first left the unit, correctional officers entered and removed him. He sued the Crown, the attackers, health care providers, and the individual correctional officers (the “Officers”), who are the respondents on appeal.

The initial Statement of Claim named Correctional Officers “A”, “B” and “C”, as the appellant did not know their identities. Once their identities were revealed, he moved to amend the Statement of Claim, in part to obtain rights of discovery respecting the Officers. The proposed Amended Statement of Claim alleged that he was assaulted as a result of the “total absence of any supervision of his Unit”, a “pattern of ongoing non-supervision of inmates”, and that the damages resulted from the “negligence, gross negligence, recklessness and breach of fiduciary duty” of the Officers, whose conduct “amounted to bad faith”. Because s. 12(1) of the Ministry of Correctional Services Act (“MCSA”) protects correctional officers from liability for acts done in good faith in the execution of their duty, the appellant needed to allege bad faith to bring claims against the Officers personally.

The Crown took the position that leave was required to proceed against the Officers under s. 17 of the Crown Liability and Proceedings Act, 2019 (“CLPA”). Section 17 applies to proceedings against the Crown or its officers or employees that include a claim “in respect of a tort of misfeasance in public office or a tort based on bad faith”. If it applies, s. 17(2) automatically stays the entire proceeding unless and until leave is granted, and under s. 17(7) the court shall not grant leave unless the proceeding is brought in good faith and there is a reasonable possibility that the claim will be resolved in the claimant’s favour.

The appellant argued that leave was not required because bad faith is not an element of negligence. In the alternative, he tendered evidence, including the surveillance video and an internal investigation report, that he said showed the Officers acted in bad faith. The respondents put forward no evidence on the motion.

The motion judge granted leave to amend the Statement of Claim, which was not challenged on appeal. She held, however, that s. 17 of the CLPA applied, stating that “[i]f bad faith allegations are made, s. 17 of the CLPA is invoked and leave is required to pursue the claims against the correctional officers.”

Applying the s. 17(7) test, the motion judge found that although the appellant brought the claims in good faith, there was no reasonable possibility of success. Bad faith requires “intent” or “conscious wrongdoing”, and none of the alleged shortcomings even met the standard of recklessness. At their highest, the Officers’ acts and omissions amounted to negligence in the execution of their duties, attracting immunity under s. 12(1) of the MCSA. Accordingly, the claims against the Officers were stayed. The appellant appealed the denial of leave to pursue the claims against the correctional officers.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in finding that the negligence claims against the officers were in respect of a “a tort based on bad faith” for the purposes of s. 17(1) of the CLPA?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

Yes.

The Court found that the motion judge erred in interpreting the phrase “a tort based on bad faith” in the context of s. 17(1) to include negligence claims. “[T]he words of an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”: Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd (Re).

The Court noted that the purpose of s. 17 is to establish a screening process allowing superior courts to screen out unmeritorious claims. Importantly, the Court noted that s. 17(1) refers to “a tort based on bad faith”, not a “claim based on bad faith”, signalling that the legislature was not concerned with any and all claims alleging bad faith but, rather, claims in respect of “a tort based on bad faith.”

The Court found that while “[t]he law does not recognize a standalone action for bad faith”, there are, however, torts where bad faith is a constituent element of the tort, the obvious example being the one specified in s. 17(1) – misfeasance in public office. The Court held that there was no dispute that the tort of misfeasance in public office can be described as a “tort of bad faith” or a “tort based on bad faith.” While the Court agreed that s. 17(1) must be read in context, it held that the broader context could not displace the precise wording of s. 17(1).

Ultimately, the Court stated that a claim framed in negligence that includes factual allegations of bad faith did not amount to a claim in respect of a tort based on bad faith. The elements of negligence did not change in the face of a statutory immunity clause; the purpose of the bad faith allegation was rather to fend off good faith statutory immunity. Had the legislature intended s. 17 to capture all allegations of bad faith in employment-related tort claims against the Crown or its officers, it could have said so. Accordingly, s. 17 did not apply and leave was not required.

Poirier v. 2621892 Ontario Inc., 2026 ONCA 788

[Roberts, George and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J.V. Allen, for the appellants

J. Beleskey and E. Madsen, for the respondent N.V.

K. Wagram, for the respondents 2628071 Ontario Ltd. carrying on business as 905 BAR, Al.C., Ad.C., L.C., L.K., J.V., J.K., M.T., A.A. and S.W.

Keywords: Torts, Assault, Battery, Contracts, Settlement Agreements, Civil Procedure, Settlements, Enforcement, Amending Pleadings, Adding Parties, Crosstown Transit Constructors v. METROLINX, 2019 ONCA 240, Remedy Drug Store Co. v. Farnham, 2015 ONCA 576

facts:

The appellants, E.P. and L.P., were injured in a physical altercation involving several individuals outside a bar late at night. A very short Snapchat video was taken of the altercation. The appellants commenced an action related to the altercation and identified N.V. as a possible participant in the altercation and brought a motion to add him as a defendant.

The appellants and N.V. reached a settlement agreement: N.V. would provide an affidavit setting out what he knew or could recall about the events that took place the night of the altercation and would cooperate as a witness at trial. His counsel advised that N.V. would depose that he was not involved in the altercation. It was agreed that “no matter what his evidence is”, the appellants would not add N.V. as a defendant. N.V. provided two affidavits. He deposed that he did not strike the appellants. The appellants took the position before the motion judge, repeated on appeal, that N.V.’s affidavit contained “demonstrably false” statements. They argued that the video showed he had struck one of the appellants, among other alleged inconsistencies.

The motion judge dismissed the motion because of a settlement agreement between the appellants and N.V. not to add him as a defendant in exchange for his affidavit evidence and cooperation as a witness. The motion judge noted that before the settlement agreement was concluded, the appellants’ counsel agreed to accept N.V.’s affidavit evidence, “no matter what his evidence is” and was made aware that N.V. would say that he was not involved in the altercation. He concluded that N.V. had complied with his obligations under the settlement agreement and that the appellants “reneged on the agreement” by seeking to add him as a defendant. The motion judge found the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable, and allowed N.V.’s motion to enforce the settlement agreement and dismissed the appellant’s motion.

The appellants challenged the order dismissing their motion to add N.V. as a defendant to their action, arguing that N.V.’s affidavits breached the settlement agreement because they were untruthful.

issues:

Did the motion judge err in failing to consider whether N.V. breached the settlement agreement by finding that he had provided “demonstrably false” affidavit evidence?

holding:

Appeal dismissed.

reasoning:

No.

The appellants bore the burden of proving that N.V. breached the settlement agreement, and the Court found that they did not meet that burden in this case. The appellant’s support for their argument consisted of an affidavit from their counsel, who reviewed the Snapchat video and referred to various pieces of evidence that she said proved the falsity of N.V.’s affidavit evidence. She asserted that contrary to his affidavits, screenshots from the Snapchat video demonstrated the untruthfulness of N.V.’s statements that two men were already on the ground when he arrived out front of the bar and that he did not hit one of the appellants.

The Court agreed with the appellants’ argument that production of a “demonstrably false” affidavit could amount to a breach of the settlement agreement, notwithstanding the agreement not to add N.V. as a defendant “no matter what his evidence is”. The Court found that “no matter what his evidence is” was intended and understood to allow for evidence from N.V. that might be unfavourable or unhelpful to the appellants. However, the appellants’ disappointment with N.V.’s affidavits did not arise from newly discovered evidence that revealed their untruthfulness but from a reassessment of evidence already in their possession before the settlement agreement was concluded. The appellants entered into the settlement agreement with full knowledge of the contents of the video and N.V.’s position that he was not involved in the altercation.

The motion judge did not explicitly determine whether N.V.’s affidavits were “demonstrably false” as alleged. However, his rejection of the falsity allegation was implicit because the appellants did not meet their evidential burden to prove that the affidavits were demonstrably false. There was no evidence clearly showing that N.V. struck either of the appellants, and in his second affidavit, N.V. corrected his statement and acknowledged that the video showed that there was one man on the ground when he arrived out front of the bar. Counsel’s opinion expressed in an affidavit did not satisfy the appellants’ burden of proof. Nor was it sufficient for the appellants to simply raise arguable issues to be determined at trial.

The motion judge’s interpretation of the settlement agreement and his finding that the appellants had reneged on the agreement by seeking to add N.V. as a defendant were entitled to appellate deference. The Court concluded that the appellants did not demonstrate that the motion judge committed a palpable and overriding error or an extricable error of law that would invoke a correctness standard of review.

F45 Training Canada Limited v. 2685802 Ontario Limited, 2026 ONCA 775

[van Rensburg, Miller and Coroza JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Koczerginski and T. Shulman, for the appellant

A. Boudreau and L. Bellisario, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Franchise Agreements, Restrictive Covenants, Non-Competition, Non-Solicitation, Enforceability, Restraint of Trade, Presumption of Unenforceability, Civil Procedure, Appeals, Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 134, Employment Standards Act, 2000, S.O. 2000, c. 41, s. 67.2, Civil Code of Québec, S.Q. 1991, c. 64, art. 2095, M & P Drug Mart Inc. v. Norton, 2022 ONCA 398, Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6, Sattva Capital Corp. v. Creston Moly Corp., 2014 SCC 53, Orillia (City) v. Metro Ontario Real Estate Limited, 2021 ONCA 291, Elsley v. J.G. Collins Ins. Agencies, [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, Payette v. Guay inc., 2013 SCC 45, MEDIchair LP v. DME Medequip Inc., 2016 ONCA 168, Dr. C. Sims Dentistry Professional Corporation v. Cooke, 2024 ONCA 388, Martin v. ConCreate USL Limited Partnership, 2013 ONCA 72, Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co., [1894] A.C. 535, Weyerhaeuser Company Limited v. Ontario (Attorney General), 2017 ONCA 1007, rev’d 2019 SCC 60, Dumbrell v. The Regional Group of Companies Inc., 2007 ONCA 59, Chilton v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co. (1997), 32 O.R. (3d) 161 (C.A.), Amberber v. IBM Canada Ltd., 2018 ONCA 571, 1401380 Ontario Limited (Wilderness North Air) v. Hydro One Remote Communities Inc., 2025 ONCA 827, Craig v. CEO Global Network Inc., 2019 ONSC 3589, Mason v. Chem-Trend Limited Partnership, 2011 ONCA 344, H.L. Staebler Company Ltd. v. Allan, 2008 ONCA 576, Lyons v. Multari (2000), 50 O.R. (3d) 526 (C.A.)

facts:

In March 2019, F45 Training Canada Limited (“F45”) entered into a franchise agreement with 2685802 Ontario Ltd. to operate an F45 fitness studio in Whitby. The franchisees reviewed and negotiated the agreement before signing it and understood that it contained non-competition and non-solicitation covenants and confirmed F45’s ownership of all customer information and goodwill associated with the studio. In October 2024, the franchisees advised F45 that they would not renew, signed a franchise agreement with The Yard Gym (“TYG”) and extended the lease on the same premises. While the F45 studio was still operating, they emailed and texted its members inviting them to convert their memberships to TYG at their current F45 rate and sent out a funding request indicating that they expected 98% of their 300 members to make the switch. F45 sought to enforce the non-competition clause (clause 20.3) and the non-solicitation clause (clause 20.4(b)).

The application judge dismissed the application. She held that a covenant’s meaning must first be determined before its reasonableness can be assessed, and that it must be clear as to activity, time and geography. She found the non-competition clause ambiguous as to the scope of restricted activities and the non-solicitation clause ambiguous on a plain reading. In her view, phrases such as “any business similar to or competitive with the Franchise Business,” “any business or customer of the Franchise Business” and “or otherwise” were undefined or vague, and F45’s right to amend its Operations Manual added further uncertainty. Ultimately, the application judge concluded that the restrictive covenants were so unclear and ambiguous that they were unenforceable. She dismissed the application without determining whether either clause was reasonable.

issues:

(1) Did the application judge err in law by applying the employment law presumption of unenforceability to the restrictive covenants in a franchise agreement?

(2) Did the application judge fail to apply the accepted principles of contractual interpretation when she concluded that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable because they were unclear and ambiguous?

(3) If the application judge erred in this regard, were either or both of the restrictive covenants reasonable in scope having regard to the legitimate proprietary interests that the appellant was entitled to protect, and therefore enforceable?

(4) If one or both restrictive covenants were enforceable, were they breached by the respondents?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

(1) Did the application judge err in law by applying the employment law presumption of unenforceability to the restrictive covenants in a franchise agreement?

No.

The Court held that restrictive covenants are presumptively invalid irrespective of the type of contract in which they appear because they are in restraint of trade. Her statement that restrictive covenants, including those in franchise agreements, are presumptively unenforceable as restraints on trade was simply a statement of the general common law principles. It is at the stage of assessing reasonableness that a distinction arises between employment contracts, which attract “more rigorous scrutiny”. Accordingly, the application judge could not have adopted the employment law enhanced level of scrutiny; as she never reached the reasonableness stage.

(2) Did the application judge fail to apply the accepted principles of contractual interpretation when she concluded that the restrictive covenants were unenforceable because they were unclear and ambiguous?

Yes.

While a covenant with unresolved ambiguity is prima facie unenforceable, the Court held that it must first interpret the covenant, applying the principles summarized in Weyerhaeuser Company Limited v. Ontario (Attorney General), including reading the agreement as a whole, in light of the surrounding circumstances and in accordance with sound commercial principles. While the plain meaning of the words used by the parties will be important, the meaning of a document is derived not just from the words used, but from the context or the circumstances in which the words were used. Courts must resist lifting a restrictive covenant out of an agreement and examining it “in a disembodied manner”: Elsley, and must not “strain to create an ambiguity where none exists”: Chilton v. Co-Operators General Insurance Co.

The meaning of a restrictive covenant, including whether it is ambiguous, is a question of contractual interpretation subject to deference absent an extricable error of law and an incorrect finding of ambiguity, or one made without considering the wording in the context of the agreement as a whole can constitute such an error. Accordingly, the Court found that the application judge erred in law by taking a decontextualized approach. The Court held that, when properly interpreted, both clauses were clear and unambiguous. The question was whether there were “unresolved ambiguities” at the end of the analysis, not whether words in the abstract were capable of more than one meaning.

a) The Non-Competition Clause

The Court held that the breadth of the range of activities covered by the clause and its prohibition of a business “similar to, or a variation of” the F45 business did not make it ambiguous as the meaning for those terms could be readily determined in the context of the business, or by reference to other clauses in the contract. Further, the Court did not agree that ambiguity was created by the use of the words “including but not limited to” in connection with the activities listed in clause 20.1. In this context, the Court found that the clause simply provided examples of activities that were considered to be similar to or competitive with the Franchise Business, while the focus of the noncompetition clause was to prohibit all similar and competitive activities. While the Court did acknowledge that the absence of a closed list made the range of activities broad, it found that such breadth did not make the clause ambiguous. The Court also found it commercially unreasonable to conclude that the franchisor’s right to amend the Operations Manual created ambiguity as the Court did not find anything to suggest that amendments could unilaterally change the character or substance of the franchise business itself.

b) Non-Solicitation Clause

The motion judge erred by concluding that since there was no definition of “any business or customer of the Franchise Business”, it was unclear whether that meant current, former or prospective F45 members “or something else”, and that the terms “any other competitive establishment” and “by direct or indirect inducement or otherwise” were vague and could encompass any action. The clause had to be read with the rest of the franchise agreement. Under clause 18, goodwill arising from use of the appellant’s intellectual property belonged to the appellant, and under clause 16.1, the appellant owned all member information, including lists of past and present members, which the respondents were licensed to use only to conduct the Franchise Business. Read together, “any business or customer of the Franchise Business” was reasonably co-extensive with the appellant’s ownership of information concerning members of the studio during the respondents’ operation of it. The clause precluded the respondents from using that customer information for a fitness studio business operating in the same market, and “or otherwise” guarded against circumvention by indirect means.

(3) If the application judge erred in this regard, were either or both of the restrictive covenants reasonable in scope having regard to the legitimate proprietary interests that the appellant was entitled to protect, and therefore enforceable?

The Court found that the non-competition clause was unreasonable and unenforceable, but that the non-solicitation clause was reasonable and enforceable. When determining reasonableness in the context of a franchise agreement, the question is whether the franchisor has “a legitimate or proprietary interest to protect in the goodwill in its … system, including the trade secrets, method of operation, contacts and other benefits that are obtained by a franchisee”: MEDIchair LP, at para. 39. The Court rejected the respondents’ request to remit the reasonableness question to the court below finding that any credibility issues were not material, and the record was complete and sufficient for the Court to determine reasonableness.

a) The Non-Competition Clause

The Court found that the scope of prohibited activities in the non-competition clause was unreasonably broad when considered together with the legitimate proprietary interests of the appellant. The protected interest was a fitness studio with group classes and equipment operating as a one-stop shop full fitness system. While it might be reasonable to preclude involvement in truly competitive one-stop shop businesses, it was unreasonable to preclude former franchisees from involvement in any and all group classes solely devoted to activities the F45 model was intended to replace, such as dance classes, yoga and outdoor exercise classes. Further, although protecting customers and goodwill might arguably justify the ten-kilometre geographic reach, the scope of restricted activities was much more extensive than necessary to protect F45’s confidential information, customer relationships and goodwill.

b) The Non-Solicitation Clause

The Court held that the non-solicitation clause was reasonable and enforceable. The clause was limited to what was necessary to protect the appellant’s legitimate proprietary interests. The clause simply restricted the respondents from soliciting the business or customers of the studio. The appellant owned the goodwill of the F45 Whitby West studio and its membership information, which the respondents were licensed to use solely to operate an F45 studio and agreed to keep confidential.

(4) If one or both restrictive covenants were enforceable, were they breached by the respondents?

Yes.

The Court found that the respondents, within the term of the non-solicitation clause, communicated with members of the F45 Whitby West studio encouraging them to join their planned new franchised group fitness studio and offering inducements to do so. The extent of the breach and the remedy were remitted to the Superior Court for determination.

Jordan v. Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group, 2026 ONCA 795

[Miller, Trotter, Osborne JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Switzer, for the appellants

K.B.J. Schultz and C. MacDonald, for the respondent Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group

P. Santini, for the respondent Finnegan Insurance Brokers Ltd.

Keywords: Contracts, Insurance, Bad Faith, Civil Procedure, Amending Pleadings, Limitation Periods, Trials, Non-Suit, Procedural and Natural Justice, Sufficiency of Reasons, Costs, Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.8, s. 148, Statutory Condition 11, Courts of Justice Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. C.43, s. 131, Rules of Civil Procedure, rr. 49.10, 49.13, 57, 57.01, 76, Hryniak v. Mauldin, 2014 SCC 7, FL Receivables Trust 2022-A v. Cobrand Foods, 2007 ONCA 425, Levac v. James, 2023 ONCA 73, Denman v. Radovanovic, 2024 ONCA 276, Krawchuk v. Sherbak, 2011 ONCA 352, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 319, Hamilton v. Open Window Bakery Ltd., 2004 SCC 9, Fernandez v. Norseman Inc., 2026 ONCA 716, Algra v. Comrie Estate, 2023 ONCA 811, Dermann v. Baker, 2019 ONCA 584, S & A Strasser Ltd. v. Richmond Hill (Town) (1990), 1 O.R. (3d) 243 (C.A.), James v. HSBC Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 440, James v. HSBC Bank of Canada, 2026 ONCA 440, More v. 1362279 Ontario Ltd. (Seiko Homes), 2023 ONCA 527

facts:

A fire destroyed a hunting camp and the plaintiffs, who were joint owners of the property, had a cash value fire insurance policy with Commonwell Mutual Insurance Group (“Commonwell”) in the amount of $55,000. They filed a Proof of Loss with Commonwell, claiming $51,000.

Initial delays in adjusting the claim resulted from an Ontario Provincial Police investigation into the cause of the fire. The investigation ended favourably for the plaintiffs, following which, Commonwell initiated the appraisal process. The umpire appraised the cash value of the property at $32,918.26. The plaintiffs took the position that the appraisal was not binding and pursued further relief. On a motion in 2022, Fraser J found the appraisal agreement to be binding. When the limitation period to appeal the order expired, Commonwell paid the plaintiffs the appraised amount. The plaintiffs later sold the property for $23,000 and continued their action against the defendants. They alleged that Commonwell had breached the insurance contract and breached the duty of good faith in adjusting the claim. They also alleged that their broker, Finnegan Insurance Brokers Ltd. (“Finnegan”), was negligent in failing to, among other things, advise them that the policy would not cover the replacement cost of the camp. The trial judge dismissed a motion brought by the plaintiffs to amend the Statement of Claim to seek this relief because the new claim asserted a new cause of action long after the limitation period had expired. The case was tried over the course of three days. At the end of the plaintiffs’ case, the defendant’s brought a motion for non-suit. The trial judge granted the non-suit motion and dismissed the action against both defendants and awarded each of them costs in the amount of $10,000. The plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their action, and the defendants cross-appealed on the issue of costs.

issues:

1. Did the trial judge apply the wrong legal test for a non-suit?

2. Did the trial judge provide insufficient reasons?

3. Was the test for non-suit met?

4. Did the trial judge err in its costs award?

holding:

Appeal dismissed. Cross-appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. Yes.

The trial judge erred when he made reference to “the summary judgment motions”. The contended that this was merely a typographical error and, when read in the context of the record before him, the trial judge’s reasons reflected the test for non-suit. The Court agreed with the defendants. At trial, the defendants were clear in the relief they were seeking. Their motion was styled as a non-suit motion. All parties filed written submissions, citing and quoting from the applicable non-suit cases. The trial judge’s decision was entitled “Decision on Motions for Non Suit”.

Beyond labels, there was no indication in the trial judge’s reasons that he applied the test for summary judgment. It would have been ill-advised for counsel to bring, and the trial judge to determine, a summary judgment motion at the end of the plaintiff’s case. By then, it was clear that there were genuine issues for trial. The question was whether there was any evidence to sustain the plaintiffs’ claims for relief. This is what the trial judge determined. It would have been preferrable had the trial judge articulated the test for non-suit. However, looking at the substance of the trial judge’s reasons, there was no basis to conclude that he failed to apply the test from FL Receivables Trust 2022-A.

Moreover, the Court was not persuaded that the trial judge’s reference to “credible evidence” suggested that he applied the wrong test. It was clear from his brief reasons that he asked himself whether there was any evidence to ground the plaintiffs’ claims against either of the defendants.

2. No.

The test for insufficiency is whether the impugned reasons frustrate meaningful appellate review. The trial judge’s reasons fell short of the ideal in several respects but were adequate for appellate review. The issue in this case was straightforward – it required a simple binary decision on whether there was any evidence or not. Considered in the context of the record as a whole, the trial judge’s reasons did not frustrate appellate review. The Court agreed with the trial judge that there was no evidence to support any of the claims advanced by the plaintiffs.

3. Yes.

At trial the plaintiffs submitted that Commonwell breached the insurance contract and acted in bad faith in adjusting the claim. The breach of contract claim is not pursued on appeal. The trial judge rejected the plaintiffs’ bad faith submissions and did not allow them to further amend their Amended Statement of claim to include this claim for damages. The trial judge was thus not obligated to consider it in his reasons, and in any event the issue was not properly before the Court.

Although it is recognized that an insurance broker/agent owes a duty of care to a prospective insured person, the plaintiffs failed to adduce any expert evidence to establish the requisite standard of care, nor did it proffer an expert opinion on whether it was breached in this case. This was fatal to their claim against their insurance broker.

The plaintiffs attempted to rely on an appraisal of G.G. on appeal, but it was not properly before the Court. With the consent of the plaintiffs’ counsel, it was struck out at trial, leaving only the appraisal award, which has been paid.

4. Yes.

An appellate court should set aside a costs award only if the order is the product of an error in principle or the award is plainly wrong. This is a high threshold because “appellate courts recognize that fixing costs is highly discretionary and that trial judges are best positioned to understand the dynamics of a case and to render a costs decision that is just and reflective of what actually happened on the ground in a case”. (Algra v Comrie Estate).

Rule 57 of the Rules of Civil Procedure identifies a myriad of factors that a decision-maker may take into account in determining whether costs should be ordered and in what amount. The trial judge focused heavily on proportionality. While he did consider other factors enumerated in r. 57, in the Court’s view, he failed to seriously consider several factors relevant to this case. For example, he overlooked the significant costs involved in the lengthy path to trial.

The trial judge made passing reference to both sides making “offers to settle this out of court consistent with there being triable issues.” Given that the plaintiffs did not recover judgment, r. 49.10(2) was inapplicable in the circumstances. However, rr. 49.13 and 57.01(1) allow a court to consider any offer to settle, including offers falling outside the scope of r. 49.10(2). This deserved further consideration by the trial judge.

When looked at in its totality, the trial judge’s assessment of costs resulted in an award that was clearly wrong and required intervention. The Court set aside the trial judge’s costs award and ordered trial costs on a partial indemnity scale that were more than four times greater than what the trial judge had awarded.

Bratusa v. Doersam, 2026 ONCA 792

[Miller, Favreau and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

M. Rendely, for the appellants

M. Furrow and A. M.H. Cuperfain, for the respondent K.L.D., personally and in her capacity as the Estate Trustee of R. C. D.

A. Turner and S. Rabinovitch, for the respondents R. D., personally and in his capacity as Estate Trustee of the Estate of R. C. D., and in his capacity as Insurance Trustee for R. H. D., E. L. D., G. G. D., and T. B. D.

Keywords: Family Law, Wills and Estates, Dependants’ Support, Civil Procedure, Jurisdiction, Real and Substantial Connection, Residence, Appeals, Fresh Evidence, Succession Law Reform Act, R.S.O. 1990, c., Family Law Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. F.3, Doersam v. Doersam, 2022 ONSC 4095, Kyko Global Inc. v. M/S Crawford Bayley & Co., 2021 ONCA 736, Sinclair v. Venezio Turismo, 2025 SCC 27, Palmer v. The Queen, [1980] 1 S.C.R. 759, Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda, 2012 SCC 17, Wang v. Lin, 2013 ONCA 33, UD Trading Group Holding PTE. Limited v. TransAsia Private Capital Limited, 2021 ONCA 279, Knowles v. Lindstrom, 2014 ONCA 116, Parrish v. Navarro, 2014 ONCA 856, Moran v. Pyle National (Canada) Ltd., [1975] 1 S.C.R. 393

facts:

The appellants appealed an order staying their application for dependant’s support under the Succession Law Reform Act. The appellant, N.B. met R.D. in Costa Rica in 2020. They were in a relationship together and lived together in Costa Rica from 2021 until 2024 when R.D. died in Costa Rica. They had one child, O.B. Prior to his death, R.D. started making testamentary plans to support N.B. and O.B. However, he did not complete these plans before his death. He left them nothing in his will and no life insurance.

After R.D.’s death, N.B. and O.B. moved to Ontario. They now live in Toronto, where O.B. goes to school and N.B. works in a community daycare. N.B. was originally from Ontario and lived here until she completed teachers’ college. Her parents still live in Ontario. N.B. brought an application for dependant support pursuant to s. 58 of the Succession Law Reform Act. The motion judge stayed the application because he found that the Ontario court did not have jurisdiction.

N.B. initiated claims for maintenance for herself and O.B. in Costa Rica. The claims were dismissed because they were brought as family law proceedings rather than as claims for dependant support under Costa Rican estates law. According to Costa Rican law, O.B. can still bring a claim for support in Costa Rica against the estate. However, Costa Rican law does not allow O.B. to claim against the life insurance policies. N.B. cannot bring a claim for dependant support in Costa Rica because R.D. and K.D. were still married at the time of his death. In these circumstances, the law of Costa Rica will not recognize N.B. as R.D.’s spouse for the purpose of a dependant support claim. According to N.B., R.D. has depleted the estate such that the life insurance policies are the primary remaining asset left.

K.D., the estate trustee for R.D.’s estate, and R.D. were married in 2008. The couple lived in Ontario prior to relocating to Costa Rica in 2017. They had four children together. The three oldest were born in Ontario and the youngest was born in Costa Rica. R.D. made a will in 2007 that named K.D. as estate trustee and left all of R.D.’s assets to her. R.D. also had over $4 million in life insurance. The insurance policies were bought in Ontario. R.D. designated the four children from his first marriage as the beneficiaries of the life insurance policies. The life insurance policies were being held in trust pursuant to a trust agreement that names R.D.’s father.

R.D. and K.D. separated in 2020. Subsequently, K.D. sought to bring family law proceedings in Ontario. In 2022, the Ontario court found that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter.

N.B. and O.B. appealed.

issues:

1. Should the court admit the appellants’ fresh evidence?

2. Did the motion judge err in finding that the Ontario court does not have jurisdiction over the appellants’ claim for dependant support?

holding:

Appeal allowed.

reasoning:

1. No.

The appellants brought a motion to introduce fresh evidence in support of the appeal. The fresh evidence consisted of social media postings from R.D.’s family made after his death, including about a memorial for R.D. and information that R.D.’s oldest son was attending high school in British Columbia.

The Court held that the evidence did not meet the test for admissibility from Palmer v. The Queen and should not be admitted. The proposed fresh evidence could not reasonably have been expected to affect the result. There was already ample evidence that R.D. had ties to Canada. Any further evidence of ties between R.D.’s family and British Columbia after his death could not have been expected to affect the outcome of the issue of whether the court in Ontario had jurisdiction over the appellants’ dependant support application.

2. Yes.

The Court explained that in order to find that a court has jurisdiction simpliciter over a claim, it must be satisfied that there is a real and substantial connection between the circumstances giving rise to the claim and the forum in which the claim is brought. The Supreme Court had established a list of presumptive factors that allow a court to assume jurisdiction over a tort claim: (a) the defendant is domiciled in the province; (b) the defendant carries on business in the province; (c) the tort was committed in the province; and (d) a contract connected with the dispute was made in the province: Club Resorts Ltd. v. Van Breda. The onus is on the plaintiff to establish that one or more presumptive connecting factors are present. If the plaintiff meets this onus, the defendant has the opportunity to rebut the presumption of jurisdiction by showing that the presumptive connecting factor does not support a real and substantial connection between the dispute and the forum.

The list of presumptive connecting factors for tort claims is not meant to be exhaustive. In identifying new presumptive connecting factors, the Supreme Court directed in Van Breda, that the court should consider: (a) Similarity of the connecting factor with the recognized presumptive connecting factors; (b) Treatment of the connecting factor in the case law; (c) Treatment of the connecting factor in statute law; and (d) Treatment of the connecting factor in the private international law of other legal systems with a shared commitment to order, fairness and comity.

As the Supreme Court explained in Van Breda, the list of connecting factors was not meant to be “an inventory of connecting factors covering the conditions for the assumption of jurisdiction over all claims known to the law.” There may be other presumptive factors that apply when dealing with other types of claims.

In this case, the motion judge considered a number of potential presumptive connecting factors, and rejected them on the basis that they were too weak to confer jurisdiction. The potential presumptive connecting factors the motion judge considered were factors derived from Van Breda in the context of a tort claim, including whether the claim dealt with property in Ontario or a contract made in Ontario. The motion judge also rejected the fact that R.D. made his will in Ontario as a presumptive connecting factor because this litigation was not a will challenge.

The motion judge rejected the appellants’ current residence as a potential presumptive factor, stating that “the current domicile of the plaintiff is not a proper consideration.” The court found this was a correct statement in the context of a tort claim. However, it does not necessarily mean that it should not be treated as a presumptive connecting factor in the context of a dependant support claim. To determine whether it should be treated as a presumptive connecting factor, it was necessary to consider the nature of a dependant support claim.

Section 58(1) of the SLRA provides for the support of dependants when the deceased has not made adequate provision for them. Section 57(1) of the SLRA defines a dependant as including a child or spouse “to whom the deceased was providing support or was under a legal obligation to provide support immediately before his or her death”. Section 57(1) further provides that “spouse” has the same meaning as under the Family Law Act. Given that the stated purpose of a dependant support claim is to provide support to the dependants of a deceased, which include spouses and children to whom the deceased was providing support before his or her death, the Court found that a dependant support claim is more akin to a claim for support in the family law context than a tort claim. Therefore, in determining what presumptive connecting factors apply, it makes sense to look at the factors that courts have previously identified as applying to claims for support in the family law context.

In the family law context, the Court has recognized that the residence of the support claimant at the time the claim is made is a presumptive connecting factor. In Knowles, Doherty J.A. held that the presumptive connecting factors relevant to a claim for support are different than those relevant to a tort claim, and that they may include the residence of the applicant. The Court added that support was meant to ensure that the future needs of dependants were met. The needs arose and were ongoing in the jurisdiction where the claimants were located at the time the claim is made. This was different from claims in tort, which seek to compensate for harms suffered as a result of past wrongful conduct. That wrongful conduct, and the harms suffered, could have occurred in a jurisdiction that may have had no connection to the plaintiff’s current residence.

Accordingly, in this case, the motion judge should have considered whether the appellants’ residence at the time they brought the application was a presumptive connecting factor for the purpose of a dependant support claim. Had he done so, he should have concluded that the appellants’ residence in Ontario at the time of the application was a presumptive connecting factor.

Once the court finds the existence of a presumptive connecting factor, the defendant can rebut the presumption by showing that the connection is nevertheless too weak to justify the Ontario court taking jurisdiction. In this case, when considering the potential presumptive connecting factors of property in Ontario or a contract made in Ontario, the motion judge found that these were too weak to create a real and substantial connection between Ontario and the claim for dependant support.

The Court reached a different conclusion when viewing the claim from the perspective of the appellants’ residence in Ontario as a presumptive connecting factor. The appellants’ need for support was in Ontario as their stated intention was to continue living here. In addition, the estate’s biggest asset through which a claim for support may be satisfied are the insurance policies that were established in Ontario. N.B. had real, pre-existing and ongoing ties to Ontario. She was born here and lived here for many years, until she moved to Costa Rica. Her parents still live here. She now has employment in Ontario, and O.B. lives and is attending to school here.

The respondents relied on the decision in the family law proceedings between R.D. and K.D. in support of their position that there was no real and substantial connection between the appellants’ claim and Ontario. However, those claims were very different. Notably, at the time K.D. brought the family law proceedings in Ontario, both she and R.D. were living in Costa Rica. The outcome of the jurisdiction motion may have been different if she had moved to Ontario with the children after the separation.

Accordingly, the Court found there was real and substantial connection between the claim for dependant support and Ontario based on the appellants’ residence in Ontario and concluded that the Ontario court has jurisdiction over the claim for dependant support.

SHORT CIVIL DECISIONS

Sitzer Group Holdings No. 1 Limited v. Grall Corporation Limited, 2026 ONCA 783

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

E. Lederman, M. Robins and L. Di Felice, for the appellants

A. Gray and E. Sherkey, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Interpretation, Arbitration Agreements, Civil Procedure, Arbitrations, Appeals, Leave to Appeal, Arbitration Act, 1991, S.O. 1991, c. 17, ss. 45, 46, Ottawa (City) v. Coliseum Inc., 2016 ONCA 363, Labourers’ International Union of North America, Local 183 v. Carpenters and Allied Workers Local 27 et al. (1997), 34 O.R. (3d) 472 (C.A.)

Arabi v. Al-Sahnawi, 2026 ONCA 787

[Lauwers, Rahman and Brownstone JJ.A.]

Counsel:

P. M. Callahan, for the appellant

H.A., acting in person

Keywords: Family Law, Civil Procedure, Trials, Evidence, Admissibility, Witnesses, Cross-Examinations, Rule in Browne v Dunn, Browne v. Dunn, (1893), 6 R. 67 (H.L.)

Beechhill Capital Corp. v. P2P Green Power Energy Solutions Inc., 2026 ONCA 786

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. P. R. Cassan and B. Hollingsworth, for the appellants

C. Patterson, for the respondents

Keywords: Contracts, Debtor-Creditor, Defences, Equitable Set-Off, Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

Im v. Elias-Haghighi, 2026 ONCA 785

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

S.I., acting in person

K B. J. Schultz and N. Sritharan, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Settlements

McFadden v. Timmins (City), 2026 ONCA 794

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

F.T.M., acting in person

C. Mitchell and B. Chung, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment

Narouz c. Fisgard Capital Corporation, 2026 ONCA 793

[Roberts, Favreau and Copeland JJ.A.]

Counsel:

W.N., acting in person

C. Shorey, for the respondent

Keywords: Contracts, Real Property, Mortgages, Torts, Fraud, Civil Procedure, Counterclaims, Summary Judgment

Tomas v. Turnbull, 2026 ONCA 784

[Lauwers, George and Rahman JJ.A.]

Counsel:

L.T., acting in person

E. Hoops and D. Rahbar, for the respondents, J. Turnbull and Key Access Financial Inc.

M. Shifman and C. King, for the respondents, M. Theriault and Theriault Holdings Inc.

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Self-Represented Litigants, Rules of Civil Procedure, Pintea v. Johns, 2017 SCC 23

Perez-Youssoufian Medicine Professional Corporation v. Liu, 2026 ONCA 804

[Fairburn A.C.J.O., Gillese and Favreau JJ.A.]

Counsel:

J. W. Srebrolow and A. Chekina, for the appellant

J. Gibson, for the respondent

Keywords: Civil Procedure, Summary Judgment