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Abigail Faust

Unfairness, Not Unconscionability: Upstream Regulation Of Consumer Contracts

Abstract

Judicial review of consumer contracts under common-law contract doctrine rarely results in invalidation of unfair terms, because the doctrine developed to police bespoke agreements, not mass transactions. This Article argues that to effectively protect consumers, standard terms should be reviewed at the production stage, rather than ex post in contract litigation, and that this shift requires neither new legislation nor a new regulator. When first drafted, standard terms are not yet contracts between specific parties but are more akin to commercial practices: unilateral policies that sellers adopt to facilitate and promote transactions. Viewed as commercial practices, standard terms can and should be scrutinized by state and federal agencies under laws banning unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce (UDAP). UDAP unfairness review is particularly well suited to regulating standard terms because it targets systematic business conduct that undermines consumer confidence in markets, rather than the exploitation of individualized circumstances to extract a bad bargain. Accordingly, standard terms that can survive individualized contract law defenses, including particularly restrictive arbitration clauses, may nonetheless constitute unfair practices under UDAP law.

Aditi Bagchi

Interpersonal Duties in Political Context

Abstract

This article explores how interpersonal moral duties are inflected by political morality, and how their political dimension manifests in contract law. Many private law scholars, especially corrective justice theorists, regard private law as essentially apolitical because it is relational. I argue that political morality shapes interpersonal obligations pervasively by virtue of the duty to support just institutions. The latter duty can give rise to relational duties where individual rights-holders relate to the public justification behind a legal rule in the appropriate way.

When a legal rule contributes to a just social order, the duty to support just institutions generates system-supporting relational duties. When a system is unjust, the duty to support just institutions can generate a duty not to exacerbate systemic wrongs by exploiting other people. While a system-supporting duty directs us to protect vulnerable individuals through the existing system, a system-correcting duty directs us to protect individuals from the existing system. System-correcting duties are less typically reflected in legal rules than system-supporting duties. Still, private law makes space for some system-correcting duties. In particular, I will show how contract law recognizes system-correcting relational duties in its rules of formation, interpretation and excuse.

Rory van Loo

The Code of Agentic Commerce

Absract

The coming era of commerce will be driven not by human consumers choosing among websites but by artificially intelligent software agents advising and increasingly purchasing on behalf of consumers. In this emerging world of agentic commerce, the most important decisions occur before the consumer ever sees a checkout page, such as how the AI agent ranks available options and what commissions retailers will pay it. How the transition to agentic commerce unfolds has large-scale implications for household affordability, the distribution of wealth, and the viability of small businesses. 

Yet the governing rules of agentic commerce are being written by dispersed actors who do not necessarily see themselves as collectively designing market infrastructure.  Judges and regulators are extending consumer protection, antitrust, and common law written for simpler human relations to transactions intermediated by AI agents. At the same time, AI providers and online retailers are negotiating universal technical protocols and contractual arrangements that function as private law. This Article offers an account of these developments as distributed rulemaking through public laws, private contracts, and technical protocols. It identifies important legal barriers that are making it less likely that agentic commerce fulfills its significant potential for societal gains. It also develops a legal framework for pushing AI agents to put consumers’ interests first, provide opportunities to small businesses, and maximize economic productivity. This is a constitutional moment for agentic commerce. Private decisions that look technical or transactional are poised to become commercial infrastructure that will be difficult to change later. The law can play a major role in building that infrastructure on trust and access rather than on opacity and gatekeeping.