Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(4) provides that an item of evidence can be authenticated through
(4) Distinctive Characteristics and the Like. The appearance, contents, substance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteristics of the item, taken together with all the circumstances.
It’s always interesting to see how courts use Rule 901(b)(4) when parties seek to authenticate social media or instant messaging evidence, and United States v. Espanola, 180 F.4th 916 (7th Cir. 2026), is no exception.
In Espanola, “[a]t Luisito Espanola’s trial on wire fraud and money laundering charges, the government introduced a series of WhatsApp messages between him and an uncharged co-conspirator in which they discussed, in real time, their commission of the charged crimes.”
In rejecting Espanola’s appeal on authentication grounds, the court cited Rule 901(b)(4) and then ruled as follows:
The authenticity requirement does not demand certainty: the proponent need only make “a prima facie showing of genuineness,” and from there we leave it to the jury to “decid[e] the evidence’s true authenticity and probative value….” United States v. Fluker, 698 F.3d 988, 999 (7th Cir. 2012).
Our application of Rule 901(b)(4) in Fluker is instructive. There, we upheld the authentication of emails the defendant’s confederate, Haywood Borders, had purportedly authored….Though no one could testify that Borders in fact sent the emails, several pieces of circumstantial evidence sufficiently linked him to them. To begin with, the emails identified the author as “Haywood Borders,” and the email address from which the author sent them was associated with an organization that Borders led….That leadership position, moreover, would have given Borders access to the email addresses to which the author sent the messages….And the messages themselves “demonstrate[d] the emails’ author had significant knowledge” that “Borders would be in a position to know and discuss with the” emails’ recipients….
This case is easier than Fluker. In short, Espanola’s messages bear his identifying information, communicate information to which only he was privy, and disclose documents uniquely within his control—creating, in sum, circumstantial evidence that establishes far more than a “prima facie showing of genuineness.”…
Start with identifying information. The chat log itself identifies one of the participants as “Luisito Espanola,” the other participant referred to him as “Luis,” and Espanola repeatedly provided his full name. Espanola’s messages also provided the mailing address at which he resided and the email address he used when registering his company and opening his bank accounts.
Next consider the information Espanola disclosed. Espanola provided the name and account numbers of bank accounts he personally opened and solely controlled. He also provided real-time updates on his application for, and Citibank’s approval of, a bank account through which he laundered the City of Moline’s deposits. Citibank records confirmed that Espanola indeed applied and received approval for a bank account on the dates depicted in the messages.
Last are the documents he transmitted. On both of the days that the city wired money to Espanola’s Washington Federal Bank account, Espanola sent screenshots of his online banking platform depicting these deposits. Then, on each of these days, Espanola sent photographs confirming deposits by check into his Citibank account, and Citibank records confirmed the deposit of two checks signed by Espanola on these days. The same evidence—screenshots of Espanola’s account and independent corroboration of the transaction—existed for Espanola’s purchase of bitcoin with the funds from his Citibank account. In sum, then, the government easily authenticated the messages through their characteristics—excluding the circumstances of discovery.
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