In 2021, Peter Mahler and Frank McRoberts litigated and blogged about the Second Department’s landmark decision in Farro v Schochet, which, as Peter observed at the time, “provides the controllers of New York LLCs with virtually unbeatable power to consummate a cash-out merger of minority members.”
In the years since Farro, that assessment has largely held true. And that’s not to say minority members haven’t tried to fight back.
This week’s post examines the First Department’s recent decision in Spano v Solar-Fi Advisor, LLC, involving a particularly compelling challenge to an LLC merger that stripped a minority member of his bargained-for governance rights in a Delaware LLC.
Armed with a clever reading of the operating agreement and the recently reinvigorated implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the minority member mounted a formidable challenge. But the First Department was unpersuaded. Another challenge to the LLC freeze-out merger bites the dust.
The Company
Sol-REIT Advisors, LLC (“Sol-REIT”), a Delaware LLC formed in 2021 to finance solar energy projects, had three equal members, one of which—ILYM Solar, LLC—was owned by James Spano and his wife. The other two members together controlled the remaining two-thirds.
Sol-REIT’s operating agreement gave Spano several rights and protections as a one-third member:
- Spano served as Sol-REIT’s President;
- He had the right to fill one seat on Sol-REIT’s three-member board of managers; and
- Significant “Major Decisions,” including the admission of new members, required the unanimous consent of all common members.
Spano alleges that when the solar market soured in late 2021, the majority set out to force him out. The majority members allegedly blamed him for Sol-REIT’s struggles, stripped him of his title as President through a 2022 amendment, starved his department of resources, and secretly formed competing ventures.
The Merger
When buyout negotiations failed, the majority used a merger to remove Spano. In late March 2023, members holding roughly two-thirds of the interests approved a reverse triangular merger among Sol-REIT, Red Oak Advisors, LLC (“Red Oak”), and Red Oak’s wholly owned subsidiary, SRA Acquisitions, LLC (“SRA”). Spano did not consent.
SRA merged into Sol-REIT, which survived as Red Oak’s wholly owned subsidiary. Sol-REIT’s common interests were converted into the right to receive Class A interests in Red Oak at an exchange ratio set by an independent valuation. Red Oak, meanwhile, became Sol-REIT’s sole member.
The merger froze Spano out of Sol-REIT entirely. Although not a traditional freeze-out merger—his interest became a right to Red Oak equity (on par with the majority Sol-REIT members)—the merger nonetheless eliminated his direct ownership, his board seat, and the protection of the unanimous-consent requirements for Major Decisions; a “governance freeze-out” of sorts. Just two days later, Red Oak, as sole member, shrank Sol-REIT’s three-member board to a single manager: Red Oak itself.
The Challenge
Spano sued in New York County Supreme Court, arguing chiefly that the majority used the merger to do indirectly what the operating agreement forbade directly: admit a new member—Red Oak—without unanimous consent. He asserted claims for breach of contract, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, and unjust enrichment.
Alternatively, Spano claimed that the majority breached the implied covenant by using its merger authority as an end-run around his negotiated governance and consent rights—the culmination of a deliberate campaign to eliminate him.
Justice Patel Finds No Basis to Disturb the Merger
Commercial Division Justice Anar Rathod Patel dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the operating agreement unambiguously authorized the merger by majority vote and that Spano’s remaining claims failed to state a viable basis for relief.
The Appeal
On appeal, Spano argued that two provisions of the operating agreement controlled:
- Section 5.1.11.1 permitted “any merger, consolidation or other business combination” upon a majority vote of the members.
- Section 5.1.12.2 required the unanimous consent of all common members before “admitting any New Member.”
According to Spano, there was only one way to reconcile those provisions consistent with the well-worn principle that a contract must be read as a whole, giving effect to all of its provisions (see GMG Capital Investments, LLC v Athenian Venture Partners I, L.P., 36 A3d 776 [Del 2012]): while a merger generally required only majority approval, a merger that also accomplished a Major Decision—such as admitting Red Oak as a new member—required unanimous consent. Otherwise, the majority could render the unanimous-consent protections meaningless simply by packaging an otherwise prohibited transaction as a merger.
Spano’s implied-covenant argument drew potential support from the Court of Appeals’ recent decision in 111 W. 57th Investment LLC v 111 W57 Mezz Investor LLC, 2026 NY Slip Op 03376 (Ct App May 28, 2026), which we covered here.
Recall that in 111 West 57th, the Court of Appeals held that a contractual grant of broad discretion does not necessarily insulate a party from an implied-covenant claim where that discretion is allegedly exercised in bad faith to destroy the counterparty’s benefit of the bargain.
Spano’s implied-covenant theory raised a similar question. Even assuming the operating agreement authorized a merger by majority vote, could the majority exercise that authority for the purpose of circumventing Spano’s consent rights and eliminating him from Sol-REIT altogether? In this vein, Spano maintained that the merger was not a legitimate exercise of contractual discretion but an orchestrated scheme to deprive him of the very protections for which he had bargained.
The First Department Affirms
In its November 5, 2026 decision, the First Department unanimously affirmed, rejecting both Spano’s contract and implied-covenant theories.
The Merger Does Not Run Afoul of the Unanimous-Consent Requirement for Member Admission
The First Department made short work of Spano’s argument that the merger improperly circumvented the operating agreement’s unanimous-consent requirement for admitting new members.
According to the Court, the operating agreement’s express authorization of “any merger” by majority vote was dispositive.
Although the merger resulted in Red Oak becoming Sol-REIT’s sole member, the Court declined to treat that result as a separate act of member admission requiring unanimous approval. In other words, the change in membership was accomplished through a transaction expressly authorized by the merger provision, not through the operating agreement’s ordinary procedures for admitting new members.
The Merger Does Not Breach the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing
The First Department was equally unpersuaded by Spano’s attempt to invoke the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The Court distinguished Spano’s principal authority, AEA Middle Market Debt Funding LLC v Marblegate Asset Management, LLC, 214 AD3d 111 (1st Dept 2023), in which the First Department sustained an implied-covenant claim arising from a restructuring allegedly designed to circumvent minority lenders’ contractual rights.
In AEA, the governing credit agreement authorized the majority lenders to direct a restructuring but also guaranteed all lenders pro rata treatment of the proceeds. The minority lenders alleged that the majority deliberately structured the transaction to divert value to themselves while depriving the minority of its bargained-for share. The First Department held that the majority’s contractual authority to direct the restructuring did not permit it to undermine those independent economic protections.
Unlike the lenders in AEA, whose right to pro rata distributions survived the restructuring, Spano could “cite no contractual benefit” that would have given him “the reasonable expectation that a majority of members would not exercise their discretion to undertake a reverse triangular merger transaction that resulted in [his] elimination from the company.”
Another Boost to Freeze-Out Mergers?
In Farro v Schochet, the Second Department gave a significant boost to LLC freeze-out mergers by holding that a minority member’s exclusive remedy for challenging a cash-out merger was a statutory appraisal proceeding. Since then, we’ve seen a steady stream of freeze-out mergers in practice. The merger has become something of a secret weapon for majority members looking to rid themselves of a dissident minority owner.
Spano is different, of course. It involves a Delaware LLC, and the decision rests on contractual interpretation rather than New York’s statutory appraisal remedy.
But Spano nonetheless closes off two potential avenues for challenging a freeze-out merger: the operating agreement’s unanimous-consent requirement for admitting new members and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
The lesson for minority members: merger protection must be bargained for expressly. A merger-specific consent requirement or tag-along protections can disarm the freeze-out merger before it happens. If the operating agreement leaves the door open to a majority-approved merger, other consent provisions—and even the implied covenant—may provide a weaker foothold for challenging the transaction than the minority expected.
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