Founders tend to assume that building a company means controlling it. The events at Nvidia this month are a sharp reminder that, legally speaking, those are two separate things. On November 12, 2026, Nvidia announced that Jensen Huang had resigned as president, chief executive officer and a member of the board, effective immediately, ending 33 years at the helm of the company he co-founded in 1993. Chief Financial Officer Colette Kress was named interim CEO, and Harvey C. Jones became the company’s first-ever board chair. For those of us who advise founders and growth-stage companies, the more interesting question is not why Huang left. It is why he could be made to leave at all.
How We Got Here
In late October, reports surfaced about Huang’s alleged relationship with a businesswoman whom U.S. intelligence reportedly suspected of ties to Chinese intelligence, and later reports described a second relationship involving an Nvidia employee. Huang acknowledged an extramarital affair and apologized to his family and colleagues. The board announced an independent investigation while saying it had no reason to believe that trade secrets or national security had been compromised. Then, sentiment on the board reportedly shifted quickly after the second alleged affair came to light, and the board decided overnight to move him out. The market reaction in the form of the hit to Nvidia’s stock price (and more broadly in the sector) was severe.
The Arithmetic of Control
Huang was Nvidia’s largest individual shareholder, but he held only about 3.5% of the outstanding shares. Nvidia also has a single class of common stock, with one vote per share, so Huang had no special voting rights to fall back on once the board and shareholders turned against him. His authority rested on performance and reputation, not on the cap table. Compare that to Mark Zuckerberg, who controls roughly 60% of Meta’s voting power through super-voting shares, and Larry Page and Sergey Brin, who keep substantial voting control of Alphabet even though they no longer run its day-to-day operations. Under ordinary corporate law principles, a board can remove a CEO no matter how many shares the CEO owns. The difference is what happens next. A founder who controls a majority of the vote can replace the directors who voted to remove him. A founder at 3.5% cannot.
Would a Dual Class Structure Have Changed the Outcome?
Possibly, though not as cleanly as one might think. In a typical dual class arrangement, public investors get one vote per share and founders hold a separate class with, for example, ten votes per share, which lets founders sell a large share of the economics while keeping control of major decisions. If Huang had held a voting majority, the board would likely have had a much harder time forcing him out. Directors who serve at the pleasure of a controlling stockholder think long and hard before crossing him.
That said, voting control would not have resolved Huang’s underlying problem. Super-voting shares do not protect anyone from regulators, criminal investigations or national security concerns. Public reporting indicates that the episode had already led to congressional calls for investigation into whether U.S. security had been compromised. A controlling founder in that position might have kept the title, but the company would still have faced the same scrutiny, and the board would have faced hard questions about its own fiduciary duties. Put simply, dual class stock might have changed who made the decision. It would not necessarily have changed the pressures behind it.
The Case for Dual Class
Google made the structure popular among major technology companies when it went public in 2004. Page and Brin argued at the time that it would insulate the company from short-term market pressure and allow management to pursue long-term strategies. Supporters say the structure lets founders make ambitious strategic investments without constantly worrying about short term performance and how the market will react, and Zuckerberg’s continued spending on virtual reality and artificial intelligence over investor objections is the usual example. Some corporate governance research has also found that dual class companies can outperform single class peers over certain periods. For a founder with a long horizon and a clear vision, those are real advantages.
The Case Against
The same mechanism that protects a founder from outside pressure can also shield the founder from accountability. WeWork is the cautionary tale. Adam Neumann’s voting control made his leadership difficult to challenge, and when the company tried to go public in 2019, concerns about its governance, valuation and business model sank the IPO, and Neumann eventually left. There are three recurring criticisms. Concentrated control can protect bad decisions from adequate oversight. The valuation benefits of dual class structures may fade as companies mature, so that what once protected innovation starts to protect entrenchment. And institutional investors, including pension funds, often oppose unequal voting rights because they believe shareholders should have a meaningful say in who leads the company. Many of these concerns have led to negotiated sunset provisions, which convert high-vote shares to ordinary shares after a set period or when a triggering event occurs.
I previously blogged about the corporate governance debate surrounding dual class structures here, here, and here.
Practical Takeaways for Founders
The first lesson is about timing. If voting control matters to you, deal with it when you structure the company, because dual class arrangements are much easier to put in place before a public offering than after ownership is widely held. The second is that a company that cannot function without its founder carries organizational risk, so building a capable executive bench and a credible succession plan protects both the founder and the company. Nvidia’s board was able to name an interim CEO right away, but reporting indicates that Huang ran a very flat organization, with more than 60 people reporting directly to him, which will be hard to unwind. The third is that at scale, a founder’s personal conduct becomes a business risk, because investors, employees and directors all depend on that founder’s judgment. The last is that every founder has to choose what kind of accountability to accept. Super-voting shares bring independence with less oversight, while a strong independent board brings accountability along with the real possibility of being replaced.
Bottom Line
Huang built one of the most consequential technology companies in history without the kind of voting control Zuckerberg has at Meta, and for decades his track record was enough. But performance and reputation are not permanent guarantees of control, whereas voting rights are written into a company’s governing documents. Every founder will make mistakes at some point. The real question is who will have the power to decide what happens when they do, and that’s a question worth answering before you go public.
This post is for general informational purposes only and is not legal advice. Founders considering a dual class structure should consult counsel about their specific circumstances.
Recent Comments